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Much attention has been paid to identifying the causes of the global
financial crisis (GFC) and developing public policy responses to prevent its
reoccurrence. Attention has turned to identifying blameworthy actors.
There is consensus that financial fraud played a role in exacerbating the
crisis. In spite of this, there have been few prosecutions.1 Only one Wall
Street executive has been jailed2 and few firms involved in the events
leading up to the crisis have been sued or prosecuted.3 Moreover, the
statute of limitations for fraud, which is typically five years, has expired.
This lack of accountability is troubling. Mayer, Cava and Baird argue that
“[w]ithout changes to the existing system, the lack of accountability for
antisocial acts of financial fraud may become a permanent feature of our
economy.”4 But, all hope is not lost. Recently, the Department of Justice
(DOJ) has discovered a little-used statute5 enacted in the wake of the
1. See David Zaring, Litigating the Financial Crisis, 100 VA. L. REV. 1405, 14101411 (2014) (discussing the government practice of assessing corporate fines coupled with
the use of deferred prosecution agreements rather than pursing criminal penalties). This
lack of prosecution can be compared to the large number of prosecutions following the
Savings & Loan Crisis of the 1980’s. See Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have
No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS Jan. 9, 2014,
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/jan/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executiveprosecutions/, archived at http://perma.cc/NDH5-VFGM (“In striking contrast with these
past prosecutions, not a single high-level executives has been successfully prosecuted in
connection with the recent financial crisis, and given the fact that most of the relevant
criminal prosecutions are governed by a five-year statute of limitations, it appears that none
will be.”).
2. See Jesse Eisinger, Why Only One Top Banker Went to Jail for the Financial Crisis,
N.Y.
TIMES
MAGAZINE,
April
30,
2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/04/magazine/only-one-top-banker-jail-financialcrisis.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/XN4X-ACQH (describing why only one Wall
Street executive went to jail for his involvement in the financial crisis); See also Zaring,
supra note 1, at 1413 (arguing that imposing civil liability largely on corporate actors is
inconsistent with the prior practice of prosecuting individual executives for fraudulent
wrongdoing). See also Zaring, id., at 1439 (identifying some potential defendants and
concluding that “[n]one of these potential defendants have been singled out, even though the
harsh expression of disapprobation presented by a criminal case might seem to be
appropriate given the intense nature of the carnage.”).
3. Zaring, supra note 1, at 1438 (“There has not been a single conviction of a bailedout bank, or a single executive who ran one.”).
4. Don Mayer, Anita Cava & Catharyn Baird, Crime and Punishment (or the Lack
Thereof) for Financial Fraud in the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown: Reasons and Remedies
for Legal and Ethical Lapses, 51 AM. BUS. L.J. 515, 519 (2014).
5. Not only have there been few lawsuits brought in its 25 year history, it has been the
subject of little scholarly commentary. Most commentary has focused on the director and
officer liability provisions. See, e.g., Robert J. Basil, Suspension and Removal of Bank
Officials Under the Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989
(FIRREA), 18 J. LEGIS. 1 (1991) (describing the suspension and removal provisions under
FIRREA); John J. Bryne, Douglas W. Densmore & Jeffery M. Sharp, Examining the
Increase in Federal Regulatory Requirements and Penalties: Is Banking Facing Another
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Savings & Loan Crisis of the 1980s. The Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA)6 imposes civil liability
for violation of certain specified criminal statutes. FIRREA’s statute of
limitations is longer, its burden of proof is lower, and the penalties can be
severe.7 It was used to force the Bank of America and Standard & Poor
settlements,8 and could be used to impose liability on other bad actors for
their actions leading up to the GFC. Moreover, its use has the potential to
transform the financial fraud landscape. But, is that a good thing?
Certainly enforcing anti-fraud provisions is desirable. However, at least
one commentator has questioned FIRREA’s resemblance to a criminal
statute.9 If FIRREA is in effect a criminal statute stripped of the procedural
safeguards afforded by criminal law, this is problematic and raises
questions of fundamental fairness.
This article will consider those broad questions. In order to
accomplish that goal, we will, in Part I, briefly outline the events leading
up to the GFC. This has been done elsewhere in more depth and it is not
our intent to replicate previous work. In Part II, we will outline the basic
provisions of FIRREA. In Part III, we will briefly consider the use of

Troubled Decade?, 24 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 19 (1995) (“While traditionally shielded by
corporate law from liability for losses so long as they exercise good faith business judgment
and act disinterestedly, directors are now confronted with the threat of virtual strict
liability. . .”); Peter A. Lowy, The Director Liability Provision of the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act: What Does it Do?, 16 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 355
(1997) (discussing the director liability provision under FIRREA); Jon Shepherd, The
Liability of Officers and Directors under the Financial Institutions, Reform, Recovery and
Enforcement Act of 1989, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1119 (1992) (discussing civil liability for
officers and directors under FIRREA); Melinda M. Ward, FIRREA – Finally Resolved?, 67
UMKC L. REV. 407, 408 (1998) (describing the context that led to the FIRREA legislation).
6. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),
Pub. L. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183. (1989) [hereinafter FIRREA].
7. The statute of limitations under FIRREA is ten years. FIRREA, §1833a (h).
8. See Nate Raymond, Bank of America Liable for Fraud in Countrywide Mortgage
Case:
Jury,
HUFFINGTON
POST,
Oct.
23,
2013,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/23/bank-of-america-fannie-mae-freddiemac_n_4151479.html, archived at http://perma.cc/XWG9-ELD6 (describing Bank of
America’s liability under FIRREA for actions that led to the financial crisis). See infra
notes 76-116 and accompanying texts where these lawsuits are discussed.
9. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, After the Fall: The Criminal Law Enforcement Response
to the S & L Crisis, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 155, 179 (1991) (stating that a civil proceeding
under FIRREA is “basically a criminal proceeding stripped of such constitutional
protections as the presumption of innocence and the requirements of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.”). See also John R. Rowlett, The Chilling Effect of the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 and the Bank Fraud
Prosecution Act of 1990: Has Congress Gone too Far?, 20 AM. J. CRIM. L. 239, 246 (1993)
(“The provisions allowing civil penalties for criminal offenses are unfair because they allow
the prosecution to circumvent the criminal standard of proof for these offenses.”).
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FIRREA in cases stemming from the GFC. Our intent is to demonstrate
the far-reaching implications of FIRREA and to outline existing case law.
Here, we will examine the cases brought by the DOJ against Bank of
America, Wells Fargo, Bank of New York Mellon and Standard & Poor’s.
This brings us to the inevitable question. FIRREA appears to be a
viable and formidable weapon in the war on financial fraud. But is it good
public policy? In Part IV, we will consider two directions of inquiry. First,
liability is imposed in the case of financial fraud largely to promote
investor confidence in the market. This is an important public policy
objective and arguably achieved by FIRREA as an enforcement tool.
Second, imposition of civil liability for violation of criminal statutes
appears to blur the distinction between civil and criminal law. However,
the public policy objectives promoted by civil law differ from those
intended by criminal law. FIRREA allows for an action to be brought by a
civil prosecutor, seeking civil damages, with a civil burden of proof for
violation of criminal law. This section of the article will consider whether
this is good public policy. In this section, we will reject the dichotomy
between civil and criminal law and consider whether FIRREA is most like
administrative law. Although we can learn a lot from a comparison with
administrative law, it is also not a perfect fit. We will conclude that
although some commentators have concerns about imposing liability based
on criminal law without the protections typically afforded in criminal
prosecutions (e.g., the heightened burden of proof), we are not persuaded
by those concerns. We believe that concerns about imposing civil liability
for violation of criminal law without the safeguards afforded criminal
defendants are based on the conventional but antiquated view of the
distinction between civil and criminal law. Instead, we believe that a more
appropriate analysis looks at whether the procedural safeguards afforded by
FIRREA are fair. In Part V, we conclude that the procedural safeguards
required can best be viewed on a spectrum based on the severity of the
punishment. Therefore, largely because of the absence of the possibility of
incarceration in a FIRREA case, we conclude that given the government’s
overwhelming objective to protect the financial markets and investors and
to generate confidence in the market, FIRREA is good public policy.
I.

THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS

The GFC began as a housing boom.10 In the years prior to the GFC,
borrowing rates were at historically low levels and credit was easy to
10. See Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the
Financial Crisis, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 46 (2009) (discussing the practice of relying on
securities backed by subprime mortgages as a contributing factor to the GFC).
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obtain. These low interest rates, especially those associated with the early
years of adjustable rate mortgages,11 fueled demand for housing and led
homebuyers to purchase homes that were more expensive than they could
afford. This set the stage for unprecedented appreciation in home prices.12
In order to understand why lenders would lend to purchasers who
could not afford the houses and the loans, one must understand the
securitization process. Through the securitization process, mortgage
originators sold individual mortgages into a pool of mortgage-backed
securities (MBSs).13 These mortgages were then housed in special purpose
vehicles (SPVs) that created and issued new debt securities with the
mortgages serving as underlying collateral.14 The securities were typically
issued in three tranches, with the first tranche bearing the most credit risk
and subsequently carrying the highest rate of return. The third tranche was
supposedly the most insulated from the risk of default and, hence, carried
the lowest return.15 Credit rating agencies rated each tranche to allow
investors to gauge the credit risk involved. Unfortunately, the ratings were
11. These adjustable rate mortgages often started with a low interest rate that allowed
borrowers to qualify for a larger loan than they might have if they had instead obtained a
fixed rate loan. See generally John C. Coffee, What Went Wrong? A Tragedy in Three Acts,
6 U. ST. THOMAS L. J. 403, 406 (2009) (describing the increase in no-document loans from
2001 to 2006); Richard E. Mendales, Collateralized Explosive Devices: Why Securities
Regulation Failed to Prevent the CDO Meltdown, and How to Fix It, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV.
1359, 1394 (2009) (describing how adjustable rate mortgages often started with a low
interest rate that allowed borrowers to qualify for later resets at higher rates they could not
afford).
12. Between 1997 and 2006, home prices actually rose by 124%! Moran, supra note
10, at 20.
13. See generally Kia Dennis, The Ratings Game: Explaining Rating Agency Failures
in the Build Up to the Financial Crisis, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1111, 1118-1122 (2009)
(arguing that “rating agencies’ underestimation of the risks of mortgage backed securities”
was economically rational); Mendales, supra note 11, at 1364-68. The practice of
securitization became so prevalent that over two-thirds of all mortgages were securitized in
2005. This contrasts with less than 20% of mortgages securitized in 1999. Nicole B.
Neuman, A ‘Sarbanes-Oxley’ for Credit Rating Agencies? A Comparison of the Roles
Auditors’ and Credit Rating Agencies’ Conflicts of Interest Played in Recent Financial
Crises, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 921, 924 (2010).
14. John T. Lynch, Credit Derivatives: Industry Initiative Supplants Need for Direct
Regulatory Intervention—A Model for the Future of U.S. Regulation?, 55 BUFF. L. REV.
1371, 1386 (2008). See also Moran, supra note 10, at 34 (describing tranches in the
mortgage pool); Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, The Promise and Perils of Credit
Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1022 (2007) (explaining collateralized debt
obligations).
15. The task of deciding how much principal was allocated to each tranche was a
complicated task accomplished by using models based on “quantitative finance.” John
Patrick Hunt, Credit Rating Agencies and the ‘Worldwide Credit Crisis’: The Limits of
Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and a Proposal for Improvement, 2009 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 109, 118 (2009).
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determined using statistical models that failed to accurately measure the
likelihood of default for each tranche.16 Securities comprising the riskiest
tranches were created and re-bundled in a way that still allowed the upper
80% of the structure to be rated highly and disguised the fact that the
underlying assets were often subprime loans.17 Because of information
asymmetry,18 these securities were marketable only because of the CRA
rating.19
As housing prices rose, there was increased pressure on mortgage
originators to issue and securitize even more mortgages.20 This pressure
16. See John Crawford, Hitting the Sweet Spot by Accident: How Recent Lower Court
Cases Help Realign Incentives in the Credit Rating Industry, 42 CONN. L. REV. 13,
16(2009).
17. See Aaron Unterman, Innovative Destruction – Structured Finance and Credit
Market Reform in the Bubble Era, 5 HASTINGS BUS. L. J. 53, 69 (2009) (“This magical
transformation was achieved in spite of the fact that the underlying securities belonged
largely to the lowest rated tranches of the original subprime securitizations.”). See also
Michel G. Crouhy, Robert A. Jarrow & Stuart M. Turnbull, The Subprime Crisis of 07,
7(Working Paper, 2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1112467, (“[T]he rating agencies
assigned AAA ratings to CDO’s senior bond tranches that did not reflect the CDO bond’s
true credit risk.”). CRAs viewed bundling MBSs as a “statistical problem” and did not think
it was necessary to analyze the underlying mortgages. David Schmudde, Responding to the
Subprime Mess: The New Regulatory Landscape, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 709, 747
(2009).
18. See infra notes 120-123 and accompanying text (defining information asymmetry
in the MBS context and explaining its effect).
19. See Coffee, supra note 11, at 409 (“In overview, investment banks bought unsound
loans because they knew they could securitize them on a global basis if – and only if – they
could obtain investment-grade ratings from major credit rating agencies. Without that rating,
the debt was unmarketable.”). See also Dennis, supra note 13, at 1122 (“Thus, the rating
agencies became the de facto gatekeepers of the market.”); David J. Matthews, Ruined in a
Conventional Way: Responses to Credit Ratings’ Role in Credit Crises, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. &
BUS. 245, 250 (2009) (“With respect to structured finance issuances, however, the CRA
rating takes on a gatekeeper role. . .”); Lawrence J. White, Credit Rating Agencies and the
Financial Crisis: Less Regulation of CRAs is a Better Response, 25 J. INT’L BANKING L. &
REG. 170 (2010) (emphasizing the importance to packagers of obtaining favorable ratings on
the securities in order to sell the securities).
20. See generally Damon Silvers & Heather Slavkin, The Legacy of Deregulation and
the Financial Crisis—Linkages between Deregulation in Labor Markets, Housing Finance
Markets, and the Broader Financial Markets, 4 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 301, 302 (2009)
(analyzing consumer debt as the cause of the financial crisis). Moreover, as the MBSs were
themselves repackaged for more than their underlying value, there was increased pressure to
both originate new mortgages and to create and sell additional derivatives. See also Claire
A. Hill, Why Did Rating Agencies Do Such a Bad Job Rating Subprime Securities?, 71 U.
PITT. L. REV. 585, 590 (“[W]ith someone to sell the loans to, lenders discovered a new
enthusiasm for making them.”); Frank Partnoy, Overdependence on Credit Ratings was a
Primary Cause of the Crisis 2, 5 (U. San Diego, Research Paper No. 09-015, 2009),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1430653 (“These transactions, too, persisted over time, so much so
that the appetite for second-level mortgage securitizations drove financial intermediaries
both to originate new and increasingly risky mortgages, and to create synthetic exposure to
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resulted in lax behavior on the part of mortgage originators.21 Credit
checks of applicants became superficial and often loans were extended
without verifying income, employment, or assets.22 Subprime lending
became common23 and mortgages were issued to borrowers who would
have not previously qualified. The practice of requiring a 20% down
payment towards the purchase of a house was virtually abandoned; interestonly and balloon payment mortgages became popular.24
Favorable ratings25 by CRAs exposed the greater economy to these
mortgages, which then could be resecuritized through tranched special purpose entities,
again at higher prices than the underlying mortgage-backed securities were trading in the
market.”).
21. Coffee, supra note 11, at 406. Coffee describes this as “a classic moral hazard
problem. Because you do not bear the risks, you will expend little time or effort on
precautions, such as screening borrowers.” Id. See also Alyssa King, The Protection of
Deposits and Depositors: A Limited Interpretation of 12 U.S.C. § 1833A, 63 CATH. U. L.
REV. 759, 763 (2013-2014) (“This environment created a moral hazard problem in which
the banks, encouraged by the government and regulators, took on risky bets”).
22. The “no doc” loans often led to fraudulent loan applications and some of them
were termed “liar loans.” See Mendales, supra note 11, at 1394-1395 (discussing such
loans). See Matthews, supra note 19, at 252 (describing how securitization both “spread
risk” and “diluted responsibility.”). Some argue this lead to an “explosion in mortgage
fraud.” See, e.g., Andrew J. Ceresney, Gordon Eng & Sean R. Nuttall, Regulatory
Investigations and the Credit Crisis: The Search for Villains, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 225,
236-237 (2009) (“Given its prevalence and scope, many commentators have speculated that
such fraud was at least partly to blame for the collapse of the mortgage market, and in turn
for triggering the credit crisis.”). Moreover, the numbers of such loans grew. See Deryn
Darcy, Credit Rating Agencies and the Credit Crisis: How the “Issuer Pays” Conflict
Contributed and What Regulators Might Do About It, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 605, 614615 (2009) (“In 2001, 28.5% of subprime borrowers could not verify information about
employment, income, or other credit-related data. This figure increased to nearly 51% in
2006.”). In addition, subprime mortgages without documentation of the borrower’s income,
assets or employment grew to 44% of the subprime market by 2005. Silvers & Slavkin,
supra note 20, at 329.
23. Subprime loans are loans made to people where the potential for default is higher
than other mortgages. Matthews, supra note 19, at 246 (“The term connotes lending to
borrowers whose employment history, savings, credit history, or other characteristics create
a higher expectation in the lender of loan default as compared to prime borrowers.”).
Subprime lending grew substantially during this period. See Crouhy, Jarrow & Turnbull,
supra note 17, at 4 (“By 2006, subprime mortgages represented 13% of all outstanding
mortgage loans with origination of subprime mortgages representing 20% of new residential
mortgages compared to the historical average of approximately 8%.”); Darcy, supra note
22, at 614 (“[S]ubprime mortgages accounted for 20%, or more than $600 billion, of all
mortgages originated in 2005.”); Silvers & Slavkin, supra note 20, at 328 (“In 2001,
subprime lending represented 7.2% of mortgage originations but exploded over the next five
years until they reached 20% of mortgage originations in 2006.”).
24. E.g., interest-only loans increased from 0% of housing loans in 2001 to 23% in
2006. Coffee, supra note 11, at 407.
25. The justification for these higher than merited ratings was a belief that any risk was
lessened by the broad diversity of loans contained in each pool, especially geographic
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toxic securities because institutional investors, like pension funds and
banks, added them to their portfolios. The money that was received by the
MBS issuers from securitizing mortgages was funneled back to mortgage
lenders and mortgage brokers who then issued increasingly risky
mortgages. The credit quality of the mortgages was of no concern to the
mortgage companies because the mortgages and the credit risks were
transferred to the SPV. The origination fees received for issuing additional
mortgages provided a powerful incentive which encouraged mortgage
originators to issue even more mortgages.26
It is clear that mortgages were granted that should not have been. It is
clear that the securities that were created by bundling these mortgages were
rated much higher than they should have been and that in some cases they
were actually worthless. Moreover, it is clear that many of the parties
involved were engaged in intentionally fraudulent activities. In fact, the
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission concluded that many of the subprime
lenders were guilty of fraudulent lending practices and that some Wall
Street actors packaged and sold these loans in ways that were fraudulent.27
Such financial fraud can be prosecuted as mail/wire fraud28 or
diversity. Moran, supra note 10, at 47. Moran equates this to a game of Russian roulette
where the likelihood of a disastrous outcome appeared to be so low that it was ignored by
CRA models. Id. In other words, CRAs believed that it was highly unlikely that all the
mortgages in the pool would default in unison because any downturn in housing would be
geographically localized. Id. Moreover, it was assumed that housing prices would continue
to rise; hence, even if a borrower defaulted, there was little risk because the values of the
underlying collateral would continue to cover any isolated losses. Coffee, supra note 11, at
407.
26. See King, supra note 21, at 763 (“The deregulation of financial institutions
encouraged the mortgage industry to issue risky mortgages under the securitization system
because they were paid based on the volume of the loans processed”). See also Brooke A.
Murphy, Credit Rating Immunity? How the Hands-Off Approach Toward Credit Rating
Agencies led to the Subprime Credit Crisis and the Need for Greater Accountability, 62
OKLA. L. REV. 735, 740 (2010) (“The originator, therefore, has no incentive to maintain
prudent lending standards, since its profits derive solely from transactional fees, and not
from the eventual repayment of the mortgage.”).
27. THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINAL REP. ON THE CAUSES OF THE FIN. AND
ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE U. S. (Comm’n Print Jan. 2011) at xxii (Accessed at
http://fcic.law.stanford.edu/report). See also King, supra note 21, at 765 (“Along every step
of the process, fraud occurred and incentives encouraged risky lending, haphazard
compositions of the securities, and the inaccurate ratings of the securities to reflect the
associated risk”).
28. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2012). Under mail/ wire fraud, one faces liability if he
engaged in 1) an intentional scheme to defraud; 2) through the use of interstate mails or
wires. In order to prove a scheme to defraud, the government must demonstrate a
misrepresentation of a material fact or a willful omission. See Carpenter v. United States,
108 S. Ct. 316, 321 (1987) (holding that an employee may be criminally liable under the
mail and wire fraud statutes when he intentionally leaks confidential business information).
See also Mayer, Cava & Baird, supra note 4, at 524 (stating that under the mail and wire

ARTICLE 3 (ELLIS) (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

USE OF FIRREA TO IMPOSE LIABILITY

1/7/16 2:52 PM

127

securities fraud.29 Why then have so few of these actors been prosecuted?
Putting aside questions of political will,30 it appears that one main obstacle
to imposing criminal liability upon both individual and corporate
wrongdoers has been the mens rea requirement. Because of the severity of
criminal sanctions, criminal liability is not imposed lightly. Among other
safeguards, in order to attach criminal liability, the defendant must have
committed the act intentionally – the so-called mens rea requirement.31
Meeting the mens rea requirement is typically more difficult than meeting
the scienter requirement or specific intent requirement necessary to prove
fraud.32 A second obstacle relates to the fact that it is often difficult to meet
the burden of proof required to criminally prosecute financial fraud cases.
One way around these obstacles to criminal prosecution is by use of
FIRREA. Enacted in the aftermath of the Savings and Loan Crisis of the
1980s, FIRREA provides civil liability for violation of certain specified
criminal statutes. As such, it offers a vehicle to “punish past fraud and
deter future fraud” in cases where imposing criminal liability is blocked by
either the mens rea requirement or the burden of proof obstacle.33 In Part
II, we will outline the basic provisions of FIRREA.
II.

FIRREA

FIRREA was enacted in the wake of the Savings & Loan (S & L)
crisis. As the true proportions of the crisis became apparent, there were
calls for action.34 Congress perceived that fraud committed by both
fraud statutes, anyone using the respective means covered by each statute to commit fraud
can be held criminally liable and punished).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013).
30. Mayer, Cava & Baird, supra note 4, at 518.
31. Barry J. Pollack, Time to Stop Living Vicariously: A Better Approach to Corporate
Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1393, 1394 (2009).
32. See Nan S. Ellis & Steven B. Dow, Attaching Criminal Liability to Credit Rating
Agencies: Use of the Corporate Ethos Theory of Criminal Liability, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 167
(2014) (considering the difficulty of meeting the mens rea requirement in the case of
corporate crime). See also Mayer, Cava & Baird, supra note 4, at 525-527 (discussing how
fraudulent intent can be inferred from the conduct of the parties).
33. Leon Weidman, Civil Remedies for Mortgage Fraud, U. S. ATT’YS’. BULL. (U. S.
Dep’t of Just. Exec. Off. for U.S. Att’ys., Wash., D.C.), May 2010, at 23.
34. It is not unusual for statutes to be enacted in the wake of crisis. See, e.g.,
Prosecuting Fraud in the Thrift Indus.: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice
of the Comm. on the Judiciary H. of Reps., 101st Cong. 2 (1989) (statement of Charles E.
Schumer, Chairman, Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary H. of
Reps.) (noting before a hearing that “[i]n the last 2 years, the Bank Board, the regulatory
agency that oversees the thrift industry, referred 11,000 cases to the Justice Department for
criminal prosecution. The flourish of referrals came after years of relative inaction on the
Bank Board’s part which appeared to favor pursuing civil suits to the exclusion of making
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outsiders and insiders (e.g., officers and directors of those institutions)
against financial institutions was a major factor leading up to the crisis.35
In fact, it was estimated that fraud accounted for between 10-100% of
savings and loan failures.36 There were several statutes already on the
books that could have been used to prosecute wrongdoers.37 For example,
the National Banking Act of 186338 made embezzlement and
misapplication of bank funds criminal39 and the bank fraud statute of 1984
extended many of the prohibitions to bank insiders.40 There were, however,

criminal referrals. Yet the Department of Justice obtained conviction in fewer than 200 of
these 11,000 cases. That means that in less than 2 percent of the criminal cases referred to
the Department of Justice has real punishment been exacted. It should be remembered that
the fraud, the enormous losses and the failed and ailing institutions actually account for only
a small portion of the entire thrift industry. That’s why it’s more important than ever that
we ferret out these few bad apples that threaten to drag down an entire industry. We should
also recognize that the very tangible benefits we receive from vigorous prosecution, $10
billion, would go a long way towards housing the homeless or feeding the poor, educating
the public, caring for the sick. . . . What faith can the public have in the system if it permits
this type of activity to go on with impunity? . . . [W]hy have there been so few successful
criminal prosecutions for bank fraud? . . . [D]oes the administration’s proposal for
remedying the thrift crisis get to the heart of the system’s failings in processing these
cases?”). See also Elisa S. Kao, Moral Hazard During the Savings and Loan Crisis and the
Financial Crisis of 2008-09: Implications for Reform and the Regulation of Systemic Risk
Through Disincentive Structures to Maintain Firm Size and Interconnectedness, 67 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 817, 860 (2012) (opining that a “good crisis should never go to waste.”).
The Savings & Loan Crisis was no exception. See also LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE S & L
DEBACLE: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS FOR BANK AND THRIFT REGULATION 180-181 (1991)
(describing FIRREAs as “an Act of anger” on the part of Congress); Carol Ann Sennello,
FIRREA’s Damage Provisions: Inequitable, Unnecessary, and Costly to Boot, 45 DUKE L. J.
183, 183 (1995) (characterizing Congress as being in a “bad mood” when it enacted
FIRREA).
35. H.R. REP. NO. 100-1088, at 1, 8 (1988). See generally Green, supra note 9, at 155156 (stating that federal officials stressed that criminal misconduct by insiders played a
large part in the thrift crisis); John J. McDonald, Jr., Similarities Between the Savings &
Loan Crisis and Today’s Current Financial Crisis: What the Past Can Tell us about the
Future, 76 DEF. COUNS. J. 470, 473-74 (2009).
36. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Congressional Re-Election Through Symbolic Politics: The
Enhanced Banking Crime Penalties, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1994) (describing early
estimates of loses due to insider fraud at 25-100% and bipartisan estimates of between 10%
and 15% percent); See Kao, supra note 34, at 833 (discussing estimates of the degree to
which criminal activity by insiders contributed to the Savings & Loan crisis). See also
Green, supra note 9, at 162-168 (outlining this underlying belief and questioning the degree
to which criminal conduct was realistically an important contributing factor).
37. See, e.g., Rowlett, supra note 9, at 241-242 (1993) (listing alternative available
criminal statutes).
38. National Banking Act, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665, 675, (1863).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 656. See Green, supra note 9, at 157-160 (discussing the
misappropriation provision and its applicability to maladministration by bank insiders).
40. 18 U.S.C. §1344 (1988).
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relatively few successful prosecutions in the financial services industry41
and sentences imposed in those cases were typically light.42 A new statute
was seen as the answer.
FIRREA was designed in part to provide a mechanism for the
government to recover some of the bailout costs associated with the S & L
crisis43 and more broadly to control “outright fraud and insider abuse.”44
Thus, the statute represented Congressional intent to punish45 wrongdoers
who engaged in fraud as well as to deter future fraudulent activity.46 To
accomplish this goal, FIRREA provides the federal government with a
significant amount of flexibility. First, it authorizes the DOJ to seek civil
penalties47 for those who violate one of fourteen specified criminal laws
41. Contra Zaring, supra note 1, at 1441 (comparing the criminal prosecution during
the savings and loan crisis to the GFC and noting that “by 1992 there had been 1100
criminal prosecutions of individuals involved in major S&L fraud, with 839 convictions,
and, in total, 5490 criminal investigations opened by the FBI.”).
42. Green, supra note 9, at 161 (“The sentences meted out to defendants who
committed banking crimes, however, were generally lenient . . . .”).
43. King, supra note 21, at 766; See Lowy, supra note 5, at 356 (outlining the basic
provisions of FIRREA and breaking them into five categories: 1) those that set aside money
for resolutions; 2) those that provide for new agency enforcement powers; 3) those that
dissolve the FSLIC and the FHLBB; 4) those that attempt to assure that a similar problem
will not occur again; and 5) those that attempt to recoup losses); See also Ward, supra note
5, at 408 (estimating that the costs to taxpayers exceeded $1 trillion).
44. H.R. REP. NO. 101-54(1), at 294 (1989). One of the general purposes of the statute
is “[t]o strengthen the civil sanctions and criminal penalties for defrauding or otherwise
damaging depository institutions and their depositors.” FIRREA § 101(10).
45. It has been described as a “punitive piece of legislation.” Sennello, supra note 34,
at 183. Bryne, Densmore and Sharp opine that “[f]ocusing on several dishonest individuals,
Congress apparently extrapolated that the banking and thrift industries had been populated
by the dishonest.” Bryne, Densmore & Sharp, supra note 5, at 1. See also Green, supra
note 9, at 168 (arguing that retribution was one of the primary goals of FIRREA “‘to get a
pound of flesh from those who committed fraud’”) (quoting 136 Cong. Rec. s9488 (daily ed.
July 11, 1990, statement of Sen. Domenici).
46. United States v. Bank of New York Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d 438, 546 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 24, 2013) (FIRREA is “consistent not only with seeking to prevent fraud perpetrated
against the financial institutions, but also with deterring or punishing fraud . . . .”). See
United States v. Serpico, 320 F.3d 691, 694 (7th Cir. 2003) (recognizing deterrence as a
major goal of the enhanced civil/criminal provisions). See also Robert Almon, Matt Greve,
& Nick Wamsley, Financial Institutions Fraud, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1023, 1042 (2013)
(“FIRREA was passed with the intention to ‘both clean up the savings and loan mess and
prevent future disasters.’”) (quoting John Leubsdorf, Symposium on James Atleson’s Values
and Assumptions in American Labor Law, A Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Retrospective
Article: Legal Ethics Falls Apart, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 959, 974 (2009)); Lowy, supra note 5, at
379 (“The language of FIRREA as it was signed into law makes clear that FIRREA’s
purpose is to strengthen the False enforcement powers and to deter unacceptable activities
that arguably caused or contributed to the savings and loan crisis.”).
47. See infra notes 156-157 and accompanying text (arguing that these civil penalties
can be imperfectly analogized to administrative penalties imposed by administrative

ARTICLE 3 (ELLIS) (DO NOT DELETE)

1/7/16 2:52 PM

130

[Vol. 18:1

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

involving financial institutions.48 Second, because the fines are civil in
nature, prosecutors merely have to show by a “preponderance of the
evidence” that the elements of the underlying crime were met.49 This lower
burden of proof greatly enhances the prospects for successful enforcement
of federal fraud statutes. Third, it creates a mechanism to gather
information using administrative subpoena power rather than having to
commence litigation to trigger the discovery process.50 Fourth, it
harmonizes civil forfeiture provisions with the general racketeering statute,
allowing regulators the ability to seize assets before they can be placed out
of the government’s reach.51
Fifth, it extends the statute of limitations to ten years to provide
regulators with sufficient time to uncover and take action against fraud.52
Lastly, it allows for payment of a reward to individuals to provide crucial
information to prosecutors53 and a whistleblower provision to protect bank
employees from retaliation.54 Some of these provisions merit further
attention.
A. Civil Penalties
FIRREA, as a so-called “hybrid” statute,55 provides civil penalties and
agencies).
48. 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(c)(1)-(3); FIRREA § 951.
49. 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(h); 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(f).
50. 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(g).
51. See, e.g., Michael Malloy, Nothing to Fear but FIRREA Itself: Revising and
Reshaping the Enforcement Process of Federal Bank Regulation, 50 OHIO ST. L. J. 1117
(1989) (examining FIERRA’s enforcement methods). See also Marc S. Nurik & Susan R.
Healy, New Federal Banking Legislation: No More Mr. Nice Guy, 65 FLA. B.J. 53 (1991)
(providing a general overview of the statute).
52. 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(h). The typical statute of limitations for civil fraud suits is
between three and five years. Jennifer Ecklund, The Evolving Definition of Mortgage
Fraud: Analyzing the Changes in Interpretation Through Court Cases and Legislation since
the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, ASPATORE, 2014 WL 3725824 (2014).
53. FIRREA, § 933(b). See Bryne, Densmore & Sharp, supra note 5, at 16 (describing
bankers as “hunted prey” because of this provision).
54. FIRREA § 932. See Rowlett, supra note 9, at 250-251 (arguing that the “bounty
hunter provisions” coupled with the whistleblower provisions provide a financial incentive
for biased or perjured testimony). Attorney General Holder has called for reform increasing
the amount of the rewards to 30% of the sanctions imposed. See Stephanie Russell-Kraft,
$1.38B S&P Settlement Cements FIRREA As DOJ Darling, Law 360 (accessed at
http://www.law360.com/articles/618042/1-38b-s-p-settlement-cements-firrea-as-doj-darling,
archived at http://perma.cc/9CP7-3MZL).
55. United States ex rel. Edward O’Donnell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 33 F.
Supp. 3d 494, 498 (S.D.N.Y 2014). In this regard, FIRREA is similar to racketeering
legislation. It is no coincidence that the statute specifically states that the procedures
applicable to civil investigation demands under FIRREA are the same as those used in
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civil forfeiture in response to criminal activity. Under Section 951, civil
liability is attached if the defendant violates one of a specified number of
criminal statutes.56 The predicate offenses are broken into two categories:
a) those that apply without any additional limitations;57 and b) those that
apply only if the violation is one “affecting a federally insured financial
institution.”58 As such, these offenses relate to fraudulent activity involving
financial institutions, or conspiracy to engage in a scheme to defraud a
financial institution. For our purposes the most important predicate
investigations under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. 18 U.S.C.
§§1961-1968 (2013) [hereinafter, “RICO”]. Not only are FIRREA and RICO structured
similarly, they share a number of predicate offenses, including bank fraud, wire fraud and
mail fraud. Congress patterned aspects of FIRREA after the RICO statute in order to
facilitate civil actions, safeguard federally insured assets, and penalize misconduct in the
financial services industry.
56. H.R. 1278 identified eight predicate offenses in the federal criminal code that could
be used as the basis for assessing civil penalties involving fraud in the financial services
industry. H.R. 1278 allows for the imposition of civil penalties for violating the following
sections of Title 18: § 215 (bank bribery); § 656 (misapplication and embezzling related to
banks); § 657 (misapplication and embezzling related to federally insured financial
institutions); § 1005 (placing of false statements by an insider in the books of a bank); §
1006 (placing of false statements by an insider in the books of an S&L); § 1007 (making a
false statement to the FDIC to induce the FDIC to enter into certain transactions); § 1014
(making a false statement to a federally insured institution in order to obtain credit); § 1344
(bank fraud). REP. ON THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS REFORM, RECOVERY AND ENFORCEMENT
ACT OF 1989, H.R. Rep. No 101-54, pt.5 at 5 (1989) [hereinafter, “Judiciary Committee
Report”]. In addition, the legislation allowed for penalties to be imposed for mail fraud (18
U.S.C. § 1341), wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343) and conspiracies related to wire and mail
fraud. Judiciary Committee Report at 5. Six additional predicate offenses were later added
by the House Judiciary Committee, bringing the total to fourteen. 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(c)(1)(3) (1966). The six additional offenses were: 18 U.S.C. §287 (false, fictitious, or fraudulent
claims); 18 U.S.C. §1001 (false statements); 18 U.S.C. §1032 (concealment of assets from a
conservator, receiver, or liquidating agent); and 15 U.S.C. §645(a) (false statements
regarding the overvaluation of securities). See 101 Cong. Rec. H17198 (daily ed. Aug. 1,
1989) (record of amendment to FIRREA). See also, Judiciary Committee Report at 9
(explaining the amendments relating to civil penalties).
57. 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(c)(1), (3) (1966). There are nine offenses listed here. These
include financial institution bribery, theft or embezzlement from a financial institution, false
entries in financial institution records, false statements to influence the FDIC and false
statements to influence regulators or financial institutions on an application.
58. 12. U.S.C. § 1833a(c)(2) (1966). There are five offenses here. These include false
claims to the United States, false statements within federal jurisdiction, concealing assets or
impeding the FDIC and mail/wire fraud. The statute does not define what is meant by
“affecting” a financial institution, but there is reason to believe that this requirement will be
interpreted broadly. See King, supra note 21 at 768 (outlining the case law considering this
question); Andrew W. Schilling, Understanding FIRREA’s Reach: When Does Fraud
“Affect” a Financial Institution?, 99 BNA BANKING REP. 186 (2012) (accessed at
http://www.buckleysandler.com/uploads/36/doc/understanding-firreas-reach.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/E8F6-TMT9).
Moreover, see infra notes 81-82, 94, 101 and
accompanying text (discussing the “self-affecting doctrine”).
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offenses are: 1) mail and wire fraud; 2) making false statements; and 3)
financial institution fraud. These fall into the second category. As such,
they are actionable only when their violation affects a federally insured
financial institution.
FIRREA provides for civil penalties as an alternative to the criminal
penalties specified in the federal criminal code.59 As a general proposition,
the maximum fine is set at $1.1 million per violation.60 For continuing
violations, the penalty may not exceed the lesser of $1.1 million each day
or $5.5 million in total.61 However, these caps can be disregarded if any
person derives any financial gain from violating any of the predicate
offenses, or if a victim suffers a loss from the activities of a violator, which
exceeds the $1.1 million/$5.5 million caps.62 The statute also provides that,
for the purposes of calculating the civil fine, losses include those suffered
by the various Federal depository insurance programs.63 In such a case, the
maximum fine levied may be equal to – but no greater than – the amount of
gain by the perpetrator(s) or loss by the victim(s). 64 In addition, the statute
makes clear that the amount of the fine can be tailored in a way that not
only provides adequate deterrence but also avoids harm to innocent parties,

59. Early drafts of the legislation called for these civil penalties to be levied in addition
(and not as an alternative) to criminal penalties set forth in the federal criminal code.
However, there were concerns that the civil penalties might be characterized by the courts as
criminal in nature, and thus, vulnerable to constitutional challenge under the Double
Jeopardy Clause. This was at least in part a response to the Supreme Court case of U.S. v.
Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) which upheld double jeopardy challenges. Judiciary
Committee Report, supra note 56, at 6. See generally Matthew Hofer, Madison Lichliter &
Bridgette Makia, Financial Institutions Fraud, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1209, 1237-1238
(2014) (discussing double-jeopardy questions raised by FIRREA). Thus, the civil penalty
section was significantly altered in the final bill. Judiciary Committee Report, supra note
56, at 7 (“The Committee on the Judiciary amended the civil penalty provisions in a number
of ways to address [the double jeopardy] concerns. The fundamental purpose of these
changes is to modify this penalty provision to make it a civil penalty in fact and law as well
as in name.”). The court in Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 105 (1997), discussed the
degree to which FIRREA’s civil sanctions might invoke double-jeopardy and found that
where the civil sanctions are intended to serve a deterrent function the fact that they also
serve a punitive function will not convert civil sanctions into criminal punishment.
60. 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(b)(1) (1966). It should be noted that the fines authorized in
FIRREA are subject to adjustment pursuant to the Federal Civil Monetary Penalties
Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-410. As such, the thresholds set in the
original FIRREA statutory language have been increased to$1.1 million. See, 28 C.F.R. §
85.3(a)(6).
61. 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(b)(2) (1966), as adjusted, per 28 C.F.R. § 85.3(a)(7).
62

12 U.S.C. § 1833a(b)(3)(A) (1966) , as adjusted, per 28 C.F.R. § 85.3(a)(6) and
(a)(7).
63. 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(3)(B) (1966).
64. 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(b)(3)(A) (1966).
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like taxpayers and depositors.65 By tying the maximum fines to economic
gains by the perpetrator(s) and/or losses by the victim(s), Congress
attempted to insulate FIRREA's civil penalty provisions from
Constitutional challenge.66
B. Standard of Proof
Because FIRREA imposes civil liability, the federal government must
prove its case by the traditional civil standard of “preponderance of the
evidence.”67 In other words, the government must prove only that it is
more likely than not that the defendants violated one of the fourteen
predicate offenses relating to defrauding a financial institution. This is a
significantly easier burden than the “beyond a reasonable doubt” burden
imposed in criminal cases.68 Williams et al. termed meeting this burden a
“walk in the park” compared to the more rigorous burden of proof in
criminal cases.69
65. Bank of New York, supra note 46, at 463. See, e.g., United States v. Menendez,
No.11-06313, 2013 WL 828926, at *5-6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2013) (setting forth the relevant
factors applicable to setting the penalty including “(1) the good or bad faith of the defendant
and the degree of his scienter; (2) the injury to the public, and whether the defendant’s
conduct created a substantial loss or the risk of substantial loss to other persons; (3) the
egregiousness of the violation; (4) the isolated or repeated nature of the violation; and (5)
the defendant’s financial condition and ability to pay”).
66. Early drafts set civil penalties at a maximum of $1 million per incident or $5
million maximum. Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 56, at 5. It was feared,
however, that the capped fine might be viewed as more punitive than remedial. Relying on
dicta from the Supreme Court in Halper, the Judiciary Committee felt that in order for the
penalty to be properly considered civil in nature, there must be a rational relationship
between the penalty amount and the government loss. Thus, they rejected the proposed
penalty of a maximum fine of $1 million regardless of the government’s pecuniary loss.
See, Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 56 at 6 (explaining the amendment tying the
penalty to loss to the government). See also, 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(b)(1)-(3)(1966) (outlining
the applicable civil fines for FIRREA violations).
67. 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(f) (1966).
68. Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 56, at 7. This was a change from earlier
drafts of the statute. As the Banking Committee considered H.R. 1278, an amendment was
offered to set the burden of proof for civil penalties using a “clear and convincing” standard.
Lower than the “reasonable doubt” standard required for criminal charges and penalties, the
“clear and convincing” standard was considered, in part, to reinforce Congressional intent to
establish the civil nature of the penalties. Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 56, at 8.
However, the Judiciary Committee lowered the burden of proof even more. When the bill
was taken up by the Judiciary Committee, the civil fine provision was redefined to
withstand judicial scrutiny. Confident that the civil fine provision would not run afoul of
the Constitution’s Double-Jeopardy Clause, the Judiciary Committee then lowered the
burden of proof to the traditional civil standard of “preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at
7-8.
69. Jay Williams, Valarie Hays & Mir Ali, FIRREA: An Old Acronym is Turning into
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C. Administrative Subpoenas and Other Fact-Finding Tools
FIRREA provides prosecutors and regulators with enhanced powers to
obtain information from potential defendants and other parties. Under the
statute, they are authorized to subpoena documents, summon witnesses,
and seek testimony under oath, so long as the government is acting in
anticipation of bringing civil charges under FIRREA.70 In doing so,
Congress obviated the need for prosecutors to actually commence litigation
and begin the discovery process to obtain evidence. As long as the
government intends to seek redress under FIRREA, prosecutors may use
administrative powers to compel production of documents and obtain
testimony. No court order is required in this context.71 Moreover, the civil
attorneys in the DOJ are allowed to freely receive any information obtained
as part of the criminal investigations by the DOJ, including grand jury
information.72
D. Civil Forfeiture
FIRREA provides regulators with the additional tool of civil forfeiture
to deal with fraud in the financial services industry: civil forfeiture. By
allowing the DOJ to seize assets connected to bank fraud, prosecutors and
regulators are empowered to safeguard a financial institution’s assets
before they can be transferred offshore or otherwise put beyond the
government’s reach.73 While a number of statutes authorize asset
the Government’s New Hammer on Banks and Other Financial Institutions, 129 BANKING
L.J. 579, 580 (2012) (“FIRREA is a comparative walk in the park for government attorneys
compared to the rigorous burden of proof required in criminal cases and the criminal
discovery rules, which are focused largely on protecting a criminal defendant’s rights”).
70. 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(g)(1) (A)-(C) (1966).
71. See Jeffrey Manns, Downgrading Rating Agency Reform, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
749, 782 (2013) (characterizing this as an “extraordinary grant of pre-suit civil discovery.”).
72. See Green, supra note 9, at 179 (“The result is that civil attorneys for the
government and criminal prosecutors may work in tandem in developing evidence.”);
Manns, supra note 71, at n. 181 (“Additionally, FIRREA allows criminal grand jury
material to be passed on for use in DOJ civil suits without a court order. This means that the
DOJ can potentially use any material developed in the pursuit of a failed criminal
investigation to have a second bite at the apple in a civil proceeding”).
73. FIRREA, § 963. The House Judiciary Committee amended the Banking
Committee’s version of H.R. 1278 to allow the use of civil forfeiture for banking related
offenses. Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 56, at 9. In addition, Congress amended
the RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 981 (2012) et seq., to include the following as predicate
offenses: 18 U.S.C. § 215 (receipt of gifts or commissions for procuring loans); 18 U.S.C. §
656 (theft or embezzlement by a bank officer); 18 U.S.C. § 657 (Embezzlement,
Abstraction, Purloining or Willful Misapplication); 18 U.S.C. § 1005 (placing of false
statements by an insider in the books of a bank); 18 U.S.C. § 1006 (placing of false
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forfeitures, this provision was modeled after the RICO provisions allowing
for forfeitures of any property obtained in violation of the statute.74
III.

FIRREA’S RECENT USE

Although FIRREA was enacted in 1989, it was virtually ignored as a
vehicle to address financial fraud until the GFC.75 This section will outline
its use in four illustrative cases from the GFC: United States v. Bank of
New York Mellon, United States v. Bank of America, United States v. Wells
Fargo and United States v. McGraw-Hill Companies. These cases provide
guidance as to the developing FIRREA case law as well as offering
evidence of its far-reaching application and of its power as a tool to combat
financial fraud.

statements by an insider in the books of an S&L); 18 U.S.C. § 1007 (making a false
statement to the FDIC to induce the FDIC to enter into certain transactions); 18 U.S.C. §
1014 (making a false statement to a federally insured institution in order to obtain credit);
and 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (bank fraud). Id. See also 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) (2012) (listing
offenses that the violation of will subject property to forfeiture).
74. For a discussion of civil forfeiture in general and RICO specifically, see Lisa H.
Nicholson, The Culture of Under-Enforcement: Buried Treasure, Sarbanes-Oxley and the
Corporate Pirate, 5 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 321, 350 (2007) (discussing RICO forfeiture
provisions). Before the government can obtain civil forfeiture under RICO, the defendant
must first be convicted of a RICO violation. Id. See also id. where Nicholson argues that
asset forfeiture is a better deterrent in the case of white collar crime, especially fraud, than
either incarceration or fines. In FIRREA cases, on the other hand, the guilt or innocence of
the property owner is irrelevant; it is enough that the property was involved in a violation to
which forfeiture attaches. In contrast, criminal forfeiture proceedings are in personam
proceedings, and confiscation is only possible upon the conviction of the owner of the
property and only to the extent of defendant’s interest in the property. See Bennis v.
Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 453 (1996) (holding that forfeiture provision was not a violation of
Due Process); United States v. One “Piper” Aztec “F” DeLuxe Model, 250 PA 23 Aircraft,
321 F.3d 355, 360 (3d Cir. 2003) (upholding lower court’s judgement of forfeiture); United
States v. Funds in the Amount of Thirty Thousand Six Hundred Seventy Dollars (Calhoun),
403 F.3d 448, 469 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding that civil forfeiture was permissible); United
States v. Contorinis, 692 F.3d at 146 (vacating and remanding forfeiture order);
United States v. Liquidators of European Federal Credit Bank, 630 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th
Cir. 2011) (“The government may pursue civil forfeiture even after a failed criminal
prosecution.”).
75. Previously, FIRREA had been used primarily against officers and directors of
failed financial institutions. Robert Anello, New Justice Department’s FIRREA Cases
Against Banks: Holding the Victim Responsible, FORBES: THE INSIDER (May 16, 2013, 11:41
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2013/05/16/new-justice-departments-firrea-casesagainst-banks-holding-the-victim-responsible, archived at http://perma.cc/98E6-HTH4.
Therefore, most of the commentary on the statute concerned the director and officer liability
provisions.
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A. United States v. Bank of New York Mellon (BNYM)76

This case was one of the first cases to use FIRREA stemming from the
GFC. As noted above,77 FIRREA provides for civil liability for violating
certain specified criminal statutes where the actions of the defendants
affect a federally insured financial institution. In this case, prosecutors
brought a claim under FIRREA against the BNYM, alleging that the bank
violated mail and wire fraud statutes in three ways. First, BNYM
represented that it provided “best execution” when pricing foreign
exchange trades under its “standing instructions” program.78 Under the
standing instructions service, BNYM automatically provided currency
exchange services as the need arose, and the client was not aware of the
actual exchange rate until after the transaction was completed. Second, the
complaint alleges that BNYM represented that it engaged in netting to
benefit clients. Netting allows a bank to aggregate exchanges and can
result in significant cost savings to the client. Third, the complaint alleges
that BNYM asserted that all standard instruction clients would receive the
same pricing. Contrary to the representations, the pricing adopted by
BNYM was not consistent with industry understanding of best execution.
Instead of providing its clients with the best prices it could obtain in the
market, BNYM collected all standing trade requests throughout the day and
held them. Each afternoon, the bank determined an aggregate level needed
to accommodate all client requests and executed the needed transactions on
its own behalf in the spot market. Later, it determined a price for each
transaction. BNYM was able to profit from this method of exchange.79
With respect to netting, it appears that some trading desks netted the trades
and others did not. Third, the Bank allegedly did not provide the same
pricing to all clients. The complaint alleges that BNYM profited
enormously from these practices. For example, standing instructions trades
generated 69% of the foreign exchange trading profits in spite of the fact
that they accounted for only 12% of the foreign exchange trading volume.80
In the BNYM case, the court considered the novel question of whether
76. Bank of New York Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d 438 (2013).
77. See cases cited and statutes cited supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text
(outlining “predicate offenses” that can serve as the basis for civil penalties under FIRREA).
78. Bank of New York Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 442, 444-447. For the facts
referenced to in this section, see id. at 444-448 (discussing BNYM’s allegedly improper
actions).
79. Id. at 447 (“For example, BNYM might sell euros to a client at the highest price at
which the euro traded that day, while buying euros from another client at the lowest price at
which the euro had traded.”).
80. Id. at 448. For discussion of these allegations, see id. at 447-458 (referencing the
allegations against BNYM).
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the affected institution required by statute could in fact be the defendant.
In other words, does the behavior that complies with the predicate offense
have to be committed by a third party? The complaint in the BNYM case
alleges that the bank practices which constituted mail and wire fraud
affected BNYM in several ways. First, these practices provided large
profits to the bank. Second, the practices exposed the bank to the potential
for liability and legal fees. Third, when clients learned of these practices,
many withdrew their business. Relying on these assertions and a plain
reading of the statute and its legislative history, Judge Kaplan rejected the
defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding:
“[i]n passing FIRREA, Congress sought to deter fraudulent
conduct that might put federally insured deposits at risk. Where,
as alleged here, a federally insured financial institution has
engaged in fraudulent activity and harmed itself in the process, it
is entirely consistent with the text and purposes of the statute to
hold the institution liable for its conduct.”81
This decision is interesting in that the bank is essentially both the
defendant and victim of the wrongdoing. The court expressly rejected the
argument that “affecting” meant “victimizing.”82
Arguably, this
interpretation of FIRREA creates civil liability for essentially any financial
crime committed by a financial institution.
A second issue discussed by the BNYM court concerned how
significant the effect on the institution had to be. The court acknowledged
that the effects had to be direct enough to trigger statutory liability. But,
the court found the effects alleged in the complaint to be sufficient, stating:
“[T]he alleged negative effects are slightly removed from the
underlying alleged scheme insofar as they manifested only when
that scheme was revealed, not as it was ongoing. No matter. The
touchstone of proximate causation is reasonable foreseeability,
and it certainly was reasonably foreseeable that this alleged
scheme, if uncovered, would result in these kinds of harms to the
Bank.” 83
The last issue considered by the court had to do with the scienter
requirement. The court opined that there were two components needed to

81. Id. at 443. See also id. at 457 (The court “declines to conclude that an institution
cannot be affected by a fraud solely because it participates in it.”). See King, supra note 21,
at 777-779 (briefly discussing this issue).
82. Id. at 451 (“If Congress had wanted to limit civil penalties to cases in which the
financial institution was the victim, it obviously could have done so; instead, it chose a
singularly broad term.”).
83. Id. at 460. See also id. at 459 (discussing that the effect had to be “substantially
direct” in order to trigger liability).
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meet the scienter requirement for mail/ wire fraud: 1) intent to deceive;
and 2) contemplation of harm to the victim. The court then concluded that
intent to deceive can be inferred from the conduct of the parties. The
complaint alleged that bank employees knew that their practices were
inconsistent with industry norms and took active steps to conceal the actual
method in which their trades were priced.84 The court found these
allegations to be sufficient.85
B. United States v. Countrywide Financial Corporation/Bank of
America86
The second case to apply FIRREA to the GFC was United States v.
Countrywide Financial Corporation. In this case, prosecutors alleged that
defendant banks violated mail and wire fraud statutes by originating loans
in violation of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae guidelines and then selling
those loans to Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae while representing that they
had adhered to those guidelines. Specifically, as default rates were rising
in 2007, Countrywide adopted a streamlined loan origination model. As
part of this model, Countrywide eliminated checks on loan quality and
compensated employees based solely on the volume of loans originated.
This allegedly led to an increase in the amount of fraud and serious loan
defects.87 Because of escalating default rates, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
began tightening their requirements and refused to purchase risky loans.
This was communicated to lenders, including Countrywide. Well aware of
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae’s actions, Countrywide represented to
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae that it had tightened the underlying
guidelines.88 Moreover, Countrywide was aware of the fact that many
aspects of the Hustle model violated Fannie/Freddie guidelines.89 In fact,
Countrywide’s internal reports revealed material defect rates of 57% in the
84. Id. at 443. For further discussion of the scienter issue, see id. at 463-464
(discussing the court’s reasoning behind its decision on the scienter issue).
85. Id. at 470 (The complaint “alleges a pattern of misrepresentations by Bank
employees who, the [complaint] plausibly alleges, knew that their representations were
false. These give rise to a strong inference that these Bank employees intended to deceive
customers into believing that they were receiving best execution as the [complaint] alleges
that term is understood”).
86. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 3d at 494 (2014).
87. Id. at 497. See also Complaint-in-Intervention, infra note 88, at ¶ 3-5 (discussing
the emphasis on quantity instead of quality of loans). This loan origination model was
called “the Hustle.” Id. at ¶ 2-4.
88. Complaint-in-Intervention of the United States of America at ¶ 51, U.S. ex rel.
O’Donnell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 33 F. Supp. 3d 494 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2014)
(No. 12 Civ. 1422).
89. Id. at ¶ 66.
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Hustle loan pool overall.90 Thus, Countrywide’s internal reports revealed
that more than half of the loans that were “cleared to close” were ineligible
for sale to any investor, even though those loans were to be sold to Freddie
Mac and Fannie Mae.91 In addition, Countrywide concealed both its bonus
structure from Fannie/Freddie and the fact that its quality control team was
incentivized to rebut quality control findings.92
The complaint alleged that the fraud affected Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac investors; however, neither Freddie Mac nor Fannie Mae are federally
insured financial institutions.93 Therefore, the question again became
whether the defendant banks can themselves be the affected financial
institutions (what has now become termed the “self-affecting” theory).
Again, the court held that the FIRREA requirement had been met. Relying
on the plain meaning of the statute, the court found that “the fraud here in
question. . . had a huge effect on BofA defendants”94 and therefore the
requisite affect was met.
Thus far, this case is the only FIRREA case to have gone to a jury.
On October 23, 2013 a jury returned a verdict in favor of the government;
Judge Rakoff subsequently imposed damages in the amount of $1.2
billion.95

90. Id. at ¶ 70.
91. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 33 F. Supp. 3d at 499.
92. In addition, it is alleged that Countrywide offered employees an incentive for
rebutting earlier findings that loans were defective. Complaint-in-Intervention of the United
States of America at ¶¶ 90, 107, Countrywide Home Loans, 33 F. Supp. 3d 494 (No. 12 Civ.
1422) (“Another former Fannie Mae executive commented that it was misleading for
Countrywide to be representing, on the one hand, that it was tightening its underwriting
controls, while simultaneously engaging in a game of ‘catch me if you can’ on the quality
control side”).
93. Complaint-in-Intervention of the United States at ¶¶ 131—133. Recall that mail
and wire fraud violations are only actionable if they impact a federally insured financial
institution. 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(c)(2). See, e.g., King, supra note 21, at 784-785 (discussing
this requirement).
94. United States v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 996 F. Supp. 2d 247, 249 (S.D.N.Y.
2014). See also Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 33 F. Supp. 3d at 494.
95. Id. at 497. Judge Rakoff relied in large part on the guidelines set forth by the
Menendez court. See Menendez, No. CV 11-06313 MMM, 2013 WL 828926, at *5-6 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 6, 2013) (setting forth the relevant criteria). After reviewing the facts of the case
relevant to those criteria, Judge Rakoff described Countrywide’s actions as “the vehicle for
a brazen fraud by the defendants, driven by a hunger for profits and oblivious to the harms
thereby visited, not just on the immediate victims but also on the financial system as a
whole.” Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 33 F. Supp. 3d, at 503.
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C. United States v. Wells Fargo Bank96

In another illustrative case, FIRREA claims were brought against
Wells Fargo Bank. Wells Fargo Bank was a participant in the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)’s Direct Endorsement Lender
Program. As a participant in that program, Wells Fargo agreed to comply
with HUD regulations related to granting mortgages. After granting a
mortgage, the lender in this program must make certain certifications
regarding compliance with HUD regulations. For example, the lender must
certify “the integrity of the data” used to determine the quality of the loan,
must perform due diligence on the loans granted, and must implement a
quality control system to review loans.97 These mortgages are then
automatically granted HUD mortgage insurance. The government alleged
that Wells Fargo engaged in reckless lending practices and falsely certified
to HUD that their loans were eligible for Federal Housing Administration
insurance.98 Specifically, the complaint alleged that Wells Fargo used
inadequately trained employees, paid a bonus based on the number of loans
written, pressured loan officers to close loans, required a short turnaround
time and employed lax underwriting standards and controls.99 Moreover,
the complaint alleged that Wells Fargo’s own Quality Assurance
department noted a high violation rate and notified senior management of
the riskiness of the loans being granted, but the Bank did nothing in
response to these results. Lastly, knowing that approximately half of their
mortgages were granted in violation of HUD regulations, the Bank
submitted claims for 97% of them.100
By now the self-affecting theory had become well settled. Judge
Furman denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss saying that the argument
“merits little discussion.”101 Here, the court found that the defendant
bank’s actions had created an increased risk of loss to the bank.

96. United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 972 F. Supp. 2d 593(S.D.N.Y. 2013).
97. Id. at 600.
98. Id. at 602.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 603.
101. Id. at 630. Judge Furman cited the Bank of New York Mellon and the
Countrywide cases in addition to relying on the plain meaning of the statute (“The question
considered by courts in these cases was whether a financial institution, through its own
misconduct, can affect itself within the meaning of FIRREA. Courts have repeatedly held
that it can.”). Id. Arguably, this makes sense since the primary purpose of FIRREA is
punitive rather than compensatory. Despite the fact that civil liability is imposed under
FIRREA, the fines serve a punitive function. Therefore, the defendant can be punished for
misconduct even when compensatory damages would be nonsensical (e.g., if the fine was
paid to the “affected” party, the defendant would be compensating itself).
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D. United States v. McGraw-Hill Companies
The most recent case to be brought by the DOJ is United States v.
McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc. In this case, the DOJ alleged that Standard & Poor
(S&P) engaged in mail and wire fraud in their rating of MBSs in the time
leading up to the GFC. The complaint alleged that S&P made several
significant misrepresentations. S&P represented that their ratings were
objective, independent and uninfluenced by any conflicts of interest. In
fact, they represented that they had internal controls and policies in place to
address conflicts of interest in ratings. At the same time, they failed to
disclose that they were receiving fees from the issuer of the Collateralized
Debt Obligations (CDOs) and MBSs. The complaint alleged that S&P
knew that the ratings inaccurately rated the riskiness of the tranches and
failed to modify the ratings out of a desire for increased revenue and
market share.102 The complaint outlined how S&P refused to downgrade
their ratings or to revise the models used to set these ratings even as
employees within the company expressed fears that their ratings were
inaccurate. Moreover, the complaint outlined how the affected financial
institutions relied on these ratings in their investment decisions.
S&P raised a number of issues in a motion to dismiss. They argued
that any representations that their ratings were independent and objective
were “generalized aspirational language and ‘puffery,’”103 that the
complaint failed to specify fraud with sufficient particularity and that the
complaint failed to allege that S&P acted with specific intent to defraud the
investors of the MBSs. In denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss,104
Judge David O. Carter rejected the “puffery” argument. He held that the
representations by the CRA were not “‘general, subjective claim[s]’ about
the avoidance of conflicts of interest,” but instead were “specific assertions
of current and ongoing policies.”105 Moreover, the court found that it is not
necessary for a FIRREA claim that the money flow directly from the party
deceived to the defendant. In other words, S&P argued that even if they

102. Complaint for Civil Money Penalties & Demand for Jury Trial at 2, United States
v. McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc., CV 13-00779 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2013) [hereinafter McGraw Hill
Complaint]. For further discussion of the facts in this case, see id. at 107 (discussing S&P’s
alleged mail and wire fraud in the time preceding the GFC).
103. Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 7, United States v. McGraw Hill
Cos., Inc., No. 2:13-cv-00779-DOC-JCG (C.D. Cal. July 8, 2013) [hereinafter Order
Denying]. See United States’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Complaint
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Procedure 9(b) and 12(b)(6) at 1, No. 2:13-cv-00779-DOCJCG (C.D. Cal. May 20, 2013) (opposing this argument, the DOJ equates this to “an
infomercial hawker’s claim that his knife will outlast any other.”).
104. Order Denying, supra note 103.
105. Id. at 9-10.
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benefitted from fraud that they were paid by the issuers of the securities,
not by the parties deceived (the investors). In rejecting this argument, the
court relied on assertions in the complaint that S&P was engaged in a
“scheme to defraud investors,” they knew this scheme would defraud
investors and that S&P would obtain money from the investors as the costs
of issuing ratings were passed through to the investors.106
The government sought damages in the amount of $5 billion. On
February 3, 2015, a settlement was reached between the parties in which
S&P agreed to pay $1.375 billion.107 While admitting that business
concerns affected rating decisions108 and that S&P executives purposely
delayed adopting new models that might have lowered ratings,109 S&P did
not admit fault.110 As part of the settlement, S&P was banned by the SEC
from rating certain types of new MBS transactions until 2016.111
E. Lessons Learned
What can we learn from these four lawsuits? We see the power of
FIRREA. Although it has been rarely used since the S&L Crisis, it is
presently a formidable weapon.112 Courts have by and large rejected the

106. Id. at 17.
107. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department and State Partners Secure
$1.375 Billion Settlement with S&P for Defrauding Investors in the Lead Up to the
Financial Crisis (Feb. 3, 2015) http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-and-statepartners-secure-1375-billion-settlement-sp-defrauding-investors,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/Z7SB-MH8H.
108. Kaja Whitehouse, Critics Blast Justice Department’s S&P Settlement, USA TODAY
(Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2015/02/03/sp-settlement14b-wrongdoing-change/22808017/, archived at http://perma.cc/UNZ6-62YR.
109. Addison Morris, DOJ announces $1.375 billion settlement with S&P, JURIST (Feb.
3, 2015), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2015/02/doj-announces-1375-billion-settlement-withsp.php. See Department of Justice Press Release, supra note 107 (indicating that S&P
acknowledged that: 1) they promised investors that its ratings were independent and
objective; 2) decisions about testing and timing of updates to the ratings models were based,
at least in part, on concerns about ongoing business relationships with issuers; 3) people in
S&P knew that many of the underlying loans were delinquent and that losses were likely;
and 4) S&P representatives continued to issue positive ratings without adjustments).
110. Samantha Sharf, S&P To Pay $1.5 Billion In Settlements With DOJ,
States, CalPERS
(FORBES,
Feb.
3,
2015),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/samanthasharf/2015/02/03/sp-to-pay-1-5-billion-insettlements-with-doj-states-calpers/, archived at http://perma.cc/EY2P-NLYL See, e.g.,
Edvard Pettersson, S&P Faces Squeeze After $1.3 Billion Countrywide Fine, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Sept.
9, 2014) (explaining that there had been speculation that S&P would settle after the
Countrywide fine was announced).
111. Whitehouse, supra note 108.
112. See Russell-Kraft, supra note 54 (featuring Acting Associate Attorney General
Stuart Delery discussing the S&P settlement by stating, “In this case, the department once
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arguments by financial institution defendants that FIRREA does not apply
to them because they are both the defendant and the victim of fraud and
instead adopted the self-affecting theory. This theory allows the DOJ to
bring FIRREA claims against financial institution defendants when their
actions injured the profitability of the defendant. Moreover, in the S&P
lawsuit we see that the DOJ does not need to prove any direct
communication between the affected financial institution and the
defendant. In the S&P case, it was enough for the DOJ to assert that
financial institutions relied on the ratings issued by the defendant. Some
see this as a “significant expansion of FIRREA’s reach.”113
The DOJ has demonstrated that FIRREA is an effective weapon. On
the heels of the Countrywide verdict, DOJ has settled case after case. In the
summer of 2015, they reached a $16.65 billion settlement with Bank of
America, $5 billion of which was to settle FIRREA claims; they reached a
$4 billion settlement with Citigroup and a $2 billion settlement with JP
Morgan Chase and Co.114 It is possible that the potential for huge liability
will induce other defendants to enter into settlements.115 Moreover, as an
example of the far-reaching potential of FIRREA, there is speculation that
the DOJ is considering initiating FIRREA suits against lenders involved in
granting and securitizing subprime automobile loans.116
again has demonstrated that FIRREA is a powerful weapon for combating financial fraud
and a vital mechanism for holding accountable those who violate the law.”).
113. Latham & Watkins Litigation Department, The DOJ’s Case Against Standard &
Poor’s and the Continued Rise of FIRREA as a Tool for Government Enforcement, LATHAM
AND
WATKINS
CLIENT
ALERT
(Apr.
15,
2013),
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCAQFjA
A&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.lw.com%2FthoughtLeadership%2FDOJ-vsSP&ei=PxtVVLu1K4OmyATyYJw&usg=AFQjCNEhEqz5VrfIUFPVTVo3wPfiul3aNw&sig2=XAKfCm0BofZCFbXBQ8dIw, archived at https://perma.cc/N5TC-G8LR?type=source.
114. Russell-Kraft, supra note 54.
115. See, e.g., Patricia S. Abril & Ann Morales Olazabal, The Locus of Corporate
Scienter, 2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 81, 113 (2006) (hypothesizing that the complications of
determining whether individuals or corporations act with the scienter requirement may
encourage settlement); Peter J. Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Potential for
Rehabilitation, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1417, 1418-1419 (2009) (emphasizing that the
difficulties that arise when applying criminal liabilities to corporations may lead to
settlement); Andrew Weissmann, A New Approach to Corporate Criminal Liability, 44 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1319, (2007) (noting that one of the dangers of imposing criminal liability in
the instance of corporate crime is thought to be the over-inclusiveness that comes from the
stigma of criminal liability). In other words, some commentators argue that corporations
enter into settlements in the case of criminal liability even when they are not in fact guilty.
Arguably, this concern of over-inclusiveness might apply to FIRREA liability.
116. Financial
Services
Report,
Morrison
Foerster,
(Spring
2015),
http://www.mofo.com/~/media/Files/Newsletter/2015/03/150309FinancialServicesReport.p
df, archived at http://perma.cc/YPZ4-P58L.
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IV.

FIRREA: SOUND PUBLIC POLICY?

A. The Public Policy of Financial Regulation
The availability of credit is essential to the smooth functioning of
financial markets, and investor confidence is essential to the availability of
credit.117 If investors do not have confidence that the risks of their
investments are relatively transparent and free from fraud, they will not
invest in the market.118 The issuers, however, often know more about their
business operations and future prospects, and as such, are in a position to
take advantage of investors by not disclosing relevant information.119 This
creates a situation of asymmetric information,120 which can hinder the
investment choices that consumers make. This in turn creates the lemons
problem.121 In his now classic example, Professor Akerlof illustrates how
information asymmetry creates an adverse selection problem.122
This

117. One of the purposes of FIRREA was to restore confidence in the regulatory
system. See, e.g., Michael M. Neltner, Government Scapegoating, Duty to Disclose, and the
S & L Crisis: Can Lawyers and Accountants Avoid Liability in the Savings and Loan
Wilderness, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 655, 662 (1993) (arguing that President Bush became aware
of the need to restore confidence in the regulatory system in the wake of the 1988
presidential election).
118. Capital markets function when funds flow from investors to issuers in an efficient
manner. This results in optimal allocation of resources in the economy. Fraud interferes
with efficient allocation. For more details on the idea of efficient allocation, see, e.g.,
ANTHONY SANTOMERO & DAVID BABBEL, FINANCIAL MARKETS, INSTRUMENTS &
INSTITUTIONS 39-52 (2001) (describing the role interest rates play in allocation of
resources). For example, it was estimated that the loss of consumer confidence in the
integrity of capital markets following Enron led to a loss of over $8 trillion in U.S. equity
markets from 2001 to 2002. Lisa H. Nicholson, The Culture of Under-Enforcement: Buried
Treasure, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Corporate Pirate, 5 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 321, 323
(2007).
119. Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, Information Asymmetry, Corporate
Disclosure, and the Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature, 31 J.
OF ACCOUNTING & ECON. 405, 407 (2001).
120. See Stephanie Rousseau, Enhancing the Accountability of Credit Rating Agencies:
The Case for a Disclosure-Based Approach, 51 MCGILL L. J. 617, 622 (2006) (“Inevitably,
information asymmetry exists in the debt market because issuers have superior information
regarding their creditworthiness than do investors.”); White, supra note 19, at 4 (“The
critical problem is one of asymmetric information: the borrower usually knows more about
the prospects for repayment than does the lender.”).
121. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. OF ECON. 488 (1970) (explaining how the presence of
information asymmetry can lead to the degradation of goods offered within a market).
122. Assume that a consumer is interested in buying lemons but he cannot tell a bad
lemon from a good lemon. Therefore, he is willing to pay an average price for the lemon.
This rewards sellers of bad lemons (the adverse selection) and promotes the sale of more
bad lemons than good lemons. Assuming that consumers are rational, they anticipate this
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applies to capital markets and creates a situation where if investors cannot
judge the value of an investment, they assume that they are being offered a
“lemon” and are unwilling to pay a high price for that investment. In other
words, if investors lack sufficient information to judge the value of a
security, they will assume it is a risky or low-value investment and either
fail to purchase that security or price it accordingly. If that happens, there
is potential for a breakdown in capital flows which will impede economic
growth.123
Financial regulation is designed to address the lemons problem with
overall aims of protecting investors and encouraging investment in
financial markets. 124 It does this by requiring disclosure and by banning
fraud.125 The disclosure requirements are far-reaching; they are intended to
adverse selection and lower the price at which they are willing to buy lemons. This, in turn,
promotes the sale of more bad lemons. Id. See also Yossi Spiegel, Topic 4: Asymmetric
Information Models of Capital Structure 1 (unpublished lesson overview)
(www.tau.ac.il/~spiegel/teaching/corpfin/Topic4.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/2SM9GWQT) (applying Akerlof’s lemons theory to corporate finance).
123. Healy & Palepu, supra note 119, at 408 (discussing how the lemons problem can
lead to a breakdown in capital markets). Rousseau explains that one result of this
information asymmetry is that it can lead to “an adverse selection problem in that the debt of
issuers with good credit quality will be undervalued, thereby undermining the viability of
the market.” Rousseau, supra note 120, at 623.
124. The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, SECURITIES EXCH. COMM’N (
http://sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml) [hereinafter Investor’s Advocate] (“The mission of
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly,
and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation”) [hereinafter Investor’s Advocate].
See generally Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC’s
Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 990 (2006) (“[T]he
SEC is charged with ensuring that investors are sufficiently confident in the integrity of
securities markets so that they do not withdraw from the market.”).
125. Thomas Lee Hazan, Disparate Regulatory Schemes for Parallel Activities:
Securities Regulation, Derivatives Regulation, Gambling and Insurance, 24 ANN. REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 375, 383 (“Disclosure rather than a merit approach remains the
regulatory philosophy of the federal securities laws today.”). The theory is that if risks are
made transparent that investors would properly price all risks. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The
Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133, 218 (1994) (discussing this
theory). See also Investor’s Advocate, supra note 124 (“The laws and rules that govern the
securities industry in the United States derive from a simple and straightforward concept: all
investors, whether large institutions or private individuals, should have access to certain
basic facts about an investment prior to buying it, and so long as they hold it. To achieve
this, the SEC requires public companies to disclose meaningful financial and other
information to the public. This provides a common pool of knowledge for all investors to
use to judge for themselves whether to buy, sell, or hold a particular security. Only through
the steady flow of timely, comprehensive, and accurate information can people make sound
investment decisions. . . . Here the SEC is concerned primarily with promoting disclosure
of important market-related information, maintaining fair dealing, and protecting against
fraud.”). Finance scholars recognize that disclosure is essential to a proper functioning
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address the quality of the securities offered and indirectly regulate the
management of the issuer companies.126 Disclosure encourages firms to
make credible commitments to investors, which then results in allocation of
capital to investors who will make the best use of it.127 Moreover, it
provides an opportunity for investors to distinguish themselves from their
competitors by offering sufficient information about the quality of the
investment.128 The overarching goal of financial and banking regulation is
to make capital available in the long run.129 Therefore, we want banks and
other lending institutions to be cautious in their lending practices (to protect
investment in those institutions) and we want issuers of securities to be
transparent and free from fraud.130
How does FIRREA work to achieve these overriding objectives? By
allowing civil action for violation of specified criminal statutes involving
crimes affecting financial institutions, FIRREA promotes the anti-fraud
aims of financial regulation. Perhaps more importantly, the recent use of
FIRREA against wrongdoers whose behavior contributed to the GFC has to
some degree worked to restore investor confidence in the market. When
investors perceive that massive financial fraud has gone unpunished they
assume that such fraud will continue and are reluctant to invest. By
enforcing anti-fraud statutes, investors and public confidence is restored.
As a hybrid statute, FIRREA blurs the line between civil and criminal
law. While liability is imposed only when the government can prove that
the defendant violated one of the listed criminal statutes, the penalties

capital market. See Joseph A. Franco, Why Antifraud Prohibitions are not Enough: The
Significance of Opportunism, Candor and Signaling in the Economic Case for Mandatory
Securities Disclosure, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 223, 231 (2002) (dividing disclosure
requirements into antifraud prohibitions and mandatory disclosure requirements).
126. See James Fanto, Paternalistic Regulation of Public Company Management:
Lessons from Bank Regulation, 58 FLA. L. REV. 859, 886 (2006) (“Historically the SEC’s
regulation of management through the federal securities laws was indirect because it was
based on disclosure.”).
127. Jonathan Macey, The Regulator Effect in Financial Regulation, 98 CORNELL L.
REV. 591, 592 (2013).
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., Kao, supra note 34(recognizing the need for liquidity and the need to
prevent the type of liquidity crises that would result from bank runs).
130. Some have argued, however, that too much regulation might actually restrict the
availability of credit. Thus, when FIRREA was enacted, some argued that it would make
lenders too cautious in their lending practices and limit the availability of credit. The
resulting “credit crunch” would be contrary to the public policy meant to be supported. See,
e.g., Rowlett, supra note 9, at 253 (“There is no doubt that FIRREA . . . [has] made lenders
more cautious in their lending. This takes for form of curtailing credit and exercising more
diligence in documentation.”).
Rowlett was concerned primarily with unintended
consequences of limiting lending by banks. Most of this article has, instead, focused on the
application of FIRREA to financial institutions not as lenders but as issuers of securities.
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imposed are said to be civil in nature. While the public policy objectives
served by imposition of civil liability differ from those of criminal law,
there is significant overlap; this overlap is illustrated by FIRREA. Thus,
the questions become: what are the public policy objectives of civil and
criminal law, does FIRREA fulfill those objectives, and how will it serve
the overarching objectives of financial regulation?
B. FIRREA: The Nature of a FIRREA Case and the Issue of
Procedural Safeguards.
1. Legal Categories
FIRREA offers one way of achieving the broader policy objectives of
financial and banking regulation. A complete policy assessment of
FIRREA requires, however, that we move beyond the area of financial
services industry regulation and consider more basic principles of
substantive law. In this section we first analyze the noteworthy features of
FIRREA using the conventional divisions of civil law, criminal law, and
administrative law. A cursory review of FIRREA reveals that while it
exhibits some features of each it does not neatly fit into any one of these
conventional categories. In this section, we will consider the hybrid nature
of the statute by examining who initiates the action, the type of sanctions
imposed as well as some procedural features of the statute. As part of this
analysis, we will consider the broad public policy objectives of criminal,
civil, and administrative law and conclude that this type of analysis is
actually unproductive. That leads us to consider the much more important
issue of procedural safeguards available to a defendant in a FIRREA case.
i.

FIRREA as Civil Law

Under FIRREA, liability is imposed only where the government can
prove that the defendant violated one of the listed federal criminal statutes,
but the sanctions imposed appear to be more civil than criminal in nature.
Incarceration, the hallmark of a criminal statute,131 is conspicuously absent.
The sum of money that a defendant has to pay under FIRREA for violating
one or more of the predicate statutes has some characteristics of a criminal
fine, some characteristics of an administrative fine, and some (perhaps the
fewest) characteristics of money damages in a civil case.
131. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 21 (2d ed. 2003)
(“[C]riminal punishment, with emphasis on imprisonment, is on the whole more drastic than
the sanctions, with emphasis upon paying money, imposed by the civil law . . . .”). See also
id. at 54 (discussing administrative fines).
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One of the hallmarks of civil liability is its compensatory nature; the
money damage judgments imposed on defendants primarily serve to
compensate injured plaintiffs.132 This is one of the key characteristics that
sets civil liability apart from criminal liability.133 FIRREA does not appear
to serve this compensatory goal because it assesses a sum of money that is
paid to the government rather than providing for compensatory damages to
be paid to the injured parties.134 In other words, the fines imposed do not
operate to compensate innocent investors who suffered losses because of
financial fraud. The non-compensatory nature of the financial penalties is a
characteristic of a criminal statute: the fines are paid to the government, not
to the victim of the criminal act. At the same time, however, the sum of
money a defendant would have to pay to the government under FIRREA is
intended, at least in part, to help compensate the federal government for the
substantial expenses it incurred in enforcing criminal statutes and
regulations governing the financial services industry. In both the savings
and loan crisis and the GFC, the government incurred substantial losses in
bailing out the financial sector. Recall that the maximum fine imposed
under FIRREA is at least tangentially tied to the amount of the
government’s loss.135 A FIRREA recovery, although not expressly tied to
the amounts of the bailouts, does provide a way to at least partly
compensate the government, if not the investors injured, for these losses.136
Another noteworthy feature of FIRREA is the standard of proof
required in an action under the statute: preponderance of evidence. This
standard of proof, which is nearly universal in civil cases137 and is typical in

132. Id. at 22.
133. As an example of the overlap between civil and criminal policy, it should be noted
that punitive damages in a civil case are designed to punish (specifically to deter) defendants
in a case of particularly egregious behavior. Such cases must be proven by a preponderance
of the evidence. Punitive damages are an accepted part of tort law and serve a legitimate
purpose.
134. One important feature of criminal law is that any financial penalties imposed are
paid as fines to the government, not to the injured party as compensation. Restitution to the
victim of the crime is, however, becoming more common in the array of sanctions available
to the judge in a criminal case. Professor LaFave writes: “In spite of the theory that criminal
law is not concerned with compensating the victim of crime, in practice restitution of
property obtained by theft is sometimes, with or without statutory authority, made a
condition of probation . . . .” LaFave, supra note 131, at 22, n.5.
135. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (indicating that for the purposes of
calculating the civil fine, losses include those suffered by the various Federal depository
insurance programs).
136. See Lowy, supra note 5, at 379 (discussing an effort in the 1980s by federal
regulators to “recoup a portion of the billions of federal dollars lost in the bankruptcy of
federally-insured banks and thrifts . . . .”).
137. LaFave, supra note 131, at 25.
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administrative law cases,138 is justified in civil cases because the absence of
punitive sanctions and the emphasis on compensation minimize the concern
over a possible erroneous outcome.
This analysis has demonstrated that while FIRREA has some of the
key characteristics of a civil statute, most notably its standard of proof, it
fails to serve the overriding public policy goal of compensating the victims.
Hence, the non-compensatory nature of the statute’s remedial provision and
the fact that the financial penalty is paid to the government require that we
consider whether or not FIRREA better fits within the category of criminal
law.
ii.

FIRREA as Criminal Law

Traditionally, civil law existed as an alternative to criminal law. As
we have demonstrated, FIRREA does not fit neatly into the category of
civil liability. The question thus becomes: to what extent is FIRREA more
appropriately viewed as a criminal statute and does it better meet the public
policy objectives of criminal law? One of the hallmarks of modern
criminal law is that prosecutions to enforce the criminal code are brought
by the government, typically by a prosecutor acting on behalf of the
public.139 This is the case with a FIRREA action which may only be
initiated by the federal government, not by private parties. This is a
traditional characteristic of both criminal law and modern administrative
law and distinguishes the statute from a typical civil action that is brought
by a private party plaintiff.
Another hallmark of criminal law is the fact that criminal law is
intended to punish wrongdoers.140 This punishment serves a variety of
public policy purposes such as deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.141
138. 2 RICHARD J. PIERCE JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 971(5th ed. 2010).
139. LaFave, supra note 131, at 22. While private prosecutions were once typical in
Anglo-American law, by the middle of the nineteenth century public prosecution became
the norm. See generally Roger A. Fairfax, Delegation of the Criminal Prosecution Function
to Private Actors, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 411 (2009) (discussing the public prosecution
norm); Allen Steinberg, From Private Prosecutor to Plea Bargaining: Criminal
Prosecution, the District Attorney, and American Legal History, 30 CRIME & DELINQUENCY
568 (1984) (describing the authoritative role of the public prosecutor in the American
criminal justice system).
140. LaFave, supra note 131, at 18 (Criminal law aims to “prevent harm to society.”
“This it accomplishes by punishing those who have done harm, and by threatening with
punishment those who would do harm, to others.”).
141. LaFave, supra note 131, at 36-47; Ashley S. Kircher, Corporate Criminal Liability
versus Corporate Securities Fraud Liability: Analyzing the Divergence in Standards of
Culpability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 157, 170 (2009) (“The goals of imposing corporate
criminal liability are retribution, rehabilitation, and deterrence.”). Some argue that
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As such, the fines and other sanctions (such as incarceration) are imposed
to punish defendants who are found guilty of engaging in criminal
behavior.142 FIRREA serves this punitive function. Judge Rakoff in the
Countrywide/Bank of America case noted that “a FIRREA action is not
primarily intended to serve compensatory functions but rather to serve
quasi-civil punitive and deterrent functions.”143 There is no threat of
imprisonment; the fine serves as the entirety of the punishment.144 The
absence of this threat is not determinative because there are many fine-only
criminal statutes.145 Incarceration is a sanction that is found only in
criminal law, but it is not a necessary condition of a criminal statute.
Insofar as criminal statutes are applied to corporate defendants,
incarceration as a punishment is impossible. This is not to suggest that the
absence of incarceration as a sanction is unimportant. As we will discuss
in Part 2 of this section, the absence of incarceration as a sanction is very
significant with respect to the issue of procedural safeguards.146
Another hallmark of a criminal law is its location in the jurisdiction’s
codes. Criminal law is placed in the criminal code, which in federal law is
rehabilitation is one of the justifications for punishing, so is deterrence. By contrast, some
reject these justifications and argue that punishment should bring about retribution (for
engaging in morally wrong behavior). See Regina A. Robson, Crime and Punishment:
Rehabilitating Retribution as a Justification for Organizational Criminal Liability, 47 AM.
BUS. L.J. 109 (2010) (discussing the merits of retribution and deterrence as goals of
organizational criminal liability).
142. Kircher, supra note 141, at 170 (“The goals of imposing corporate criminal
liability are retribution, rehabilitation, and deterrence.”); Robson, supra note 141. For a
discussion of the difference between damages awarded in civil suits and fines imposed in
the criminal context, see Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of
Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 609, 619 (1998) (“Just as fines fail to express condemnation
relative to imprisonment of natural persons, so civil damages fail to express it relative to
criminal liability for corporations. Indeed, like fines, civil damages seem to connote that
society is ‘pricing’ corporate crime.”).
143. Countrywide Opinion and Order, supra note 86, at 5. See also id. at 11 (noting the
punitive and deterrent nature of FIRREA’s civil penalty provisions).
144. This is not unusual in the case of corporate crime. Retribution is an important
public policy goal furthered by imposition of criminal penalties upon corporations. See
Kircher, supra note 141, at 170 (“the fine is meant to be proportional to the harm committed
by the corporate offender in an effort to satisfy the public’s demand for justice.”). See
generally Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 833 (2000) (discussing the purpose of corporate criminal liability); Robson,
supra note 141 (discussing criminal law as the ultimate deterrent to corporate crime). In the
case of corporate crime, however, retribution is achieved largely through assessment of a
fine on the corporation.
145. These are mainly minor misdemeanors. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,
532 U.S. 318 (2001) (equating a fine-only offense with a misdemeanor).
146. See infra notes 166-174 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of the
lack of incarceration as an important element of a consideration of the procedural safeguards
required).
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found in Title 18 of the United States Code. FIRREA appears in Title 12,
which weighs heavily against classifying it as a criminal statute. This is
not merely playing with labels. Other than the threat of incarceration and
placement in the criminal code, there are no other unambiguous
characteristics of criminal law.
Criminal law also serves an important deterrent function. As a
justification for imposition of criminal penalties, deterrence is traditionally
broken down into specific and general deterrence.147 Specific deterrence is
intended to deter this particular defendant from committing criminal acts in
the future; general deterrence is intended to deter other similarly situated
individuals from engaging in similar misconduct.148 FIRREA is intended to
serve a deterrent effect. Its legislative history makes it clear that one of the
“primary purposes of [FIRREA was to] . . . enhance the regulatory
enforcement powers of the depository institution regulatory agencies to
protect against fraud . . . .”149
In order to establish liability under FIRREA the government must
prove that the defendant violated one of the specified federal criminal
statutes, i.e. predicate offenses. The use in FIRREA of existing criminal
statutes to establish standards of behavior is, in fact, part of the established
practice of attaching civil liability to conduct that falls below standards
established in criminal statutes.150 The use in civil cases of standards of
behavior established in criminal statutes is not surprising because despite
their differences, both criminal law and civil law aim “to shape people’s
conduct along lines that are beneficial to society . . . .”151 Once a legislature
identifies conduct as deserving moral condemnation and labels it criminal
(by placing the statute in the criminal code, e.g. Title 18 of the United
States Code), the subsequent step of imposing civil liability for engaging in
that same behavior (with proof by a preponderance of evidence) is
147. LaFave, supra note 131, at 37-40.
148. Id. at 37-38; Marcia Narine, Whistleblowers and Rogues: An Urgent Call for an
Affirmative Defense to Corporate Criminal Liability, 62 CATH. U.L. REV. 41, 54 (2012);
Weissmann, supra note 115, at 1325.
149. H.R. Rep. 101-54(I), at 307-08 (1989). See also Judge Kaplan’s comments supra
note 81 and accompanying text (holding a federally insured financial institution civilly
liable under FIRREA). See generally John Leubsdorf, Symposium on James Atleson’s
Values and Assumptions in American Labor Law, A Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Retrospective
Article: Legal Ethics Falls Apart, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 959, 974 (2009) (stating that FIRREA
was passed “both to help clean up the savings and loan mess and to prevent future
disasters”).
150. For example, many jurisdictions hold that violation of a criminal statute is
negligence per se (“or at least evidence of negligence”) in an action brought by someone
who is among those intended to be protected by that statute. LaFave, supra note 131, at 2526.
151. LaFave, supra note 131, at 21.
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relatively unproblematic. In the case of FIRREA, instead of the courts
using a statute to establish a standard of behavior with which to impose
common law liability (e.g., for fraud), Congress is using its own criminal
statutes (in U.S.C. Title 18) to establish a standard of behavior to impose
statutory civil liability (under U.S.C. Title 12). For this reason, FIRREA’s
use of existing criminal statutes in no way compels us to classify it as a
criminal law.
In a FIRREA case, the government can prevail by proving its case by
a preponderance of the evidence. This standard of proof makes considering
FIRREA as a criminal statute problematic. This is because one of the most
significant features of a criminal prosecution is the requirement that the
government prove its case against the defendant beyond a reasonable
doubt. The place this traditional safeguard has in a criminal prosecution
was recognized by the end of the eighteenth century and was confirmed
more than four decades ago by the Supreme Court in In re Winship.152 The
conventional justification for this high standard of proof is that the severe
penalties that might be imposed on a defendant who is convicted of a
crime, namely incarceration and possibly the death penalty, civil
disabilities such as denial of the right to vote, along with the stigma that
attaches to a criminal conviction, mandate that extreme measures be taken
to avoid an erroneous conviction.153 In other words, the highest standard of
proof provides a high level of confidence to society (on whose behalf the
prosecution is undertaken) that the array of severe penalties is imposed on a
defendant only when there is a very high level of confidence of that
defendant’s guilt. The absence of a requirement in FIRREA of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt highlights the critical question in this analysis:
does the significantly lower standard of proof (preponderance of evidence)
signify that the statute does not fall into the conventional category of
criminal law, or does it suggest that FIRREA is a defective criminal statute
because it lacks an important procedural safeguard? It has already been
152. In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970), the Court stated that “[t]he requirement
that guilt of a criminal charge be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt dates at
least from our early years as a Nation.” The Court also noted that “[i]t is now accepted in
common law jurisdictions as the measure of persuasion by which the prosecution must
convince the trier of all the essential elements of guilt.” Id. at 361 (quoting C. MCCORMICK,
EVIDENCE § 321, at 681-2 (1954)).
The proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard is seen as “a prime instrument for reducing
the risk of convictions resting on factual error. The standard provides concrete substance
for the presumption of innocence . . . .” Id. at 363. Although the Court did not limit its
holding to criminal cases in which the defendant was convicted and incarcerated, id. at 364,
it is abundantly clear that the majority of the court was primarily concerned about a
mistaken conviction resulting in imprisonment and the stigmatization that accompanies a
criminal conviction. Id. at 363-64.
153. Id.
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suggested that while FIRREA embodies some features of a criminal statute,
it also embodies some features of civil law. Moreover, because it lacks the
threat of incarceration and stigma associated with criminal law, it cannot
comfortably be classified as a criminal law. The presence of the lowest
standard of proof is an important additional reason. At the same time, this
lower standard of proof does raise the important issue of procedural
safeguards.154
This brief examination of FIRREA within the conventional categories
of criminal law and civil law reveals that while its purpose fits within the
“broad aim of the criminal law,” namely, preventing harm to the public,155
and it exhibits some of the hallmarks of a criminal law, it does not fit neatly
into that category. At the same time, we also see that while it exhibits
some of the hallmarks of a civil liability statute, it does not fit neatly into
that category either. However, civil law and criminal law do not exhaust
the major categories of modern American law. Over the last century
administrative law has become an increasingly important area of law, in
some ways surpassing the importance of the more traditional areas. It is to
this category that we now turn in our analysis of FIRREA.
iii. FIRREA as Administrative Law
A conventional analysis of FIRREA should not be limited to the
traditional categories of civil law and criminal law.
American
administrative law was established over a century ago and it occupies a
dominant position in American law.156 The history and the public policies
underlying administrative law make it appropriate to include it in the
analysis of FIRREA. In fact, FIRREA comports with many features of
administrative law. Given the circumstances that led up to its enactment,
154. See infra notes 165-175 and accompanying text (comparing the burden of proof
used in criminal law with the burden used in administrative law).
155. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW HORNBOOK SERIES 10 (2000).
156. For background on the history of American administrative law, see generally
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 120-29, 329-49, 559-63 (3d. Ed.
2005) [hereinafter Friedman, History] (providing background information on the history of
American administrative law); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH
CENTURY 59-67 (2002) [hereinafter Friedman, American Law] (describing the emergence of
state and local regulations in response to numerous public health and safety problems);
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL R. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
PROCESS 8-32 (6th Ed. 2014) (outlining the various justifications for administrative law and
the changing interpretations of the role of government regulations); BERNARD SCHWARTZ,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 28-35 (3d. Ed. 1991) (summarizing the major changes in
administrative law in the United States during the twentieth century). Federal agencies
adjudicate far more disputes each year than do federal courts. PIERCE, supra note 138, at
909.
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this is not surprising. FIRREA is a potent tool provided to federal bank and
financial services regulators to prevent harm to the public through the
imposition of the sanctions permitted by the statute. Seen from this
perspective, FIRREA is neither extraordinary nor at odds with the
underlying policy objectives of administrative law. Administrative actions
are brought by the government, as is the case with an action under
FIRREA, which is brought by the DOJ, an executive
agency. Administrative fines are imposed on those found to be in violation
of relevant standards of behavior. The fine is not compensatory in nature
and must be paid to the government, not to an individual who was injured
as the result of the defendant’s actions. This is largely descriptive of the
sanctions imposed under FIRREA. Finally and perhaps most importantly,
the standard of proof in FIRREA is preponderance of evidence, which is
the default standard in administrative law.157 A standard of proof that is
less than beyond a reasonable doubt is one of the key features that
distinguishes administrative law from criminal law.
Finding that FIRREA loosely fits within the model of administrative
law raises the question of whether is promotes the policy goals of
administrative law. The rise of the administrative state, starting mainly in
the nineteenth century, was in response to the perception that conventional
criminal law and civil law processes were inadequate to effectively deal
with an array of social and economic problems that arose during that
period.158 Shifting the problem of worker injuries away from tort litigation
in civil courts is just one example.159 Conventional legal processes, both
civil and criminal, were judged to be inadequate to effectively deal with
these problems. In enacting FIRREA, Congress expressed the policy that
existing civil law and criminal law processes were inadequate to deal with
the significant wrongful behavior that had been occurring and was feared to
continue to occur in the banking and financial services industries. There is
no doubt that Congress has the authority to shift to administrative-like

157. See infra note 171 and accompanying text (explaining that the Supreme Court
generally requires only a preponderance of the evidence as the standard of proof in
administrative proceedings, absent a statutory mandate dictating otherwise). See also
Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 68 (discussing the fact that Congress considered
imposing a higher burden of proof of clear and convincing evidence).
158. This story is told in Pierce’s administrative law treatise, among many other
sources. See, e.g., PIERCE, SHAPIRO & VERKUIL, supra note 156, at 6-20 (explaining the
objectives of administrative law with reference to specific problems addressed by
government regulations).
159. See generally FRIEDMAN, HISTORY, supra note 156, at 516-18 (summarizing the
introduction of the workers’ compensation system); FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW, supra note
156, at 62, 353-55, 361-64, 539-40 (providing further background information on transition
towards the workers’ compensation system).
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measures such as those contained in FIRREA to address these problems
and doing so does not raise issues of fundamental fairness.
It is tempting to view FIRREA through the lens of administrative law.
Several key features of FIRREA are routinely found in that area of law.
However, administrative law ultimately does not provide a perfect
framework within which to analyze FIRREA. The main reason for this
conclusion is that the standards of behavior which are the subject of a
FIRREA enforcement action are not embodied in agency regulations. They
are embodied in federal criminal statutes. As a result, the enormous body
of case law and scholarly commentary that deals with whether agency
rules, which are the subject of enforcement actions, go beyond the scope of
the agency’s authority is irrelevant. The vulnerably of some agency rules
to the claim that they are ultra vires is completely avoided in FIRREA
because these standards of conduct are embodied in federal criminal
statutes and as such cannot be challenged under the array of theories that
agency rules can be challenged.
Thus far this section has been organized around an effort to ascertain
whether FIRREA fits into one of the conventional categories into which
law is routinely divided. This effort was based on the assumption that the
statute has to fit within one of these categories, and if it does not, then the
statute is flawed and its enforcement problematic. Recall that some
commentators have argued that FIRREA is flawed because it is essentially
a criminal statute stripped of the procedural safeguards associated with
criminal law. It is submitted, however, that the assumption that FIRREA
must fit within a conventional category is itself flawed. The apparent
failure of FIRREA to fit within an existing legal category is not significant
because there is no inherent need for it to fit within one of these categories.
As lawyers and legal scholars, we are so used to thinking about law along
these lines that we come to believe (at an early point in law school) that
these categories are necessary, that they are inherent in the nature of law.
The fact of the matter is that these categories are conventional. Writing
about the distinction between public and private law that exists within the
civil law tradition, John Henry Merryman and Rogelio Perez-Perdomo state
that “[t]he conventional way of dividing the law becomes part of the law
itself, affecting the way that law is formulated and applied.”160 The public
law-private law distinction “seems to most civil lawyers to be fundamental,
necessary, and, on the whole, evident.”161 These authors suggest that
lawyers within the common law tradition “tend to think of the division of
160. JOHN MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PEREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 91 (3d Ed. 2007).
161. See MERRYMAN & PEREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 160, at 92 (“They know that public
law and private law are essentially different.”).
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law as conventional . . . ,”162 but this gives common law lawyers far more
credit than they deserve. Common law lawyers, like civil lawyers, have
created their own sets of intellectual straitjackets. Common law lawyers
tend to think of the civil law–criminal law distinction as “fundamental,
necessary, and, on the whole, evident.” This results in calling into question
a statute like FIRREA because it does not easily fit into one of these
categories.
The assumption on which the conventional analysis is based, i.e. that a
law must fall within the established categories of civil law, criminal law, or
administrative law is very similar to the assumption that resulted in a
decades-long struggle over the origin and development of administrative
law. The belief that established categories of traditional substantive law
and the procedures that were linked to them could not effectively deal with
the array of significant problems facing federal, state, and local
governments and the corresponding effort to fashion a modern
administrative regime to remedy these problems, were met by an onslaught
of criticism that doing so would upend the natural order of the legal world.
The critics argued that established legal categories were the only ways in
which legal reality could be perceived and that any other arrangement
would have dire consequences.163
The fundamental question regarding FIRREA is not whether the
statute falls within the categories of civil law, criminal law, or
administrative law. The fundamental question in the analysis of FIRREA
is whether or not Congress can or should authorize an executive agency of
the federal government (the DOJ) to bring an action to enforce standards of
behavior contained in existing criminal statutes and specify that if it can be
proved by a preponderance of evidence that the defendant violated those
standards, then financial penalties, which may be substantial, can be
assessed against that defendant. The purpose of FIRREA is not to make
any changes in the targeted conduct; FIRREA targets exactly the same
conduct that is targeted in the predicate statutes.164 Instead, the enactment

162. Id. at 91.
163. PIERCE, SHAPIRO & VERKUIL, supra note 156, at 8-23.
164. Approaching this matter from a very different perspective, Richard Epstein
presents an interesting analysis on the relationship between tort and criminal law. He argues
that the decision to utilize the civil law tort system or the criminal system is not a critical
one. The critical, threshold decision is whether specific conduct should be prohibited. In
his view, far too much conduct is prohibited. But, for him, once we decide that specific
conduct should be prohibited, the question of whether to do so through the civil tort system
or through the criminal justice system is not an important one. His preference is for using
the tort system, but he readily acknowledges that there are a number of inefficiencies in the
tort system that call for using the criminal justice system in certain situations. Richard A.
Epstein, Symposium: The Tort/Crime Distinction: A Generation Later, 76 B.U. L. REV. 1
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of FIRREA reflects Congress’s judgment that the original sanctioning
mechanism—the criminal justice system—was inadequate and needed to be
supplemented with an alternative sanctioning mechanism. It happens that
this alternative sanctioning mechanism shares a number of characteristics
with civil law and administrative law. This bypasses the issue of how to
categorize the statute and instead raises the important issue of procedural
safeguards.
2. Procedural Safeguards
Recall that some critics of FIRREA contend that it resembles a
criminal statute more than a civil statute.165 The concern expressed is that
FIRREA is in essence a criminal statute, imposing criminal sanctions but
without the procedural safeguards afforded by criminal law. The
fundamental fairness of FIRREA is thus called into question. Instead of
thinking about civil law, criminal law, and administrative law as distinct
categories, a more useful way to approach a critical issue in FIRREA is to
look at these together on a continuum. What we notice with respect to
sanctions (and the related consequences of error) is that as the quality and
the quantity of the sanctions become more severe, there is an increase in
the number of safeguards that should be in place. This is true along the
entire continuum. For example, when the consequence of an error is
requiring someone to pay compensatory damages, the quality and quantity
of safeguards are relatively minimal. But, when the consequence of an
error is incarcerating someone in prison or, perhaps, imposing the death
penalty, the quality and quantity of safeguards should be at their highest
level. The same basic relationship is also true within a more narrow range
along the continuum, such as what is conventionally labeled criminal law.
For example, the constitutional right to a jury trial does not exist in every
criminal case. It is not triggered unless the statute includes the possibility
of incarceration for more than six months.166 Similarly, the constitutional

(1996). With respect to FIRREA, Congress has already made the judgment that the specific
conduct targeted in the predicate criminal statutes should be prohibited. And, as we have
discussed in the previous section, there are important public policy reasons behind
regulation of financial markets. For more information, see supra notes 117-30 and
accompanying text (discussing the role of regulation in restoring investor confidence and
stabilizing financial markets).
165. See, e.g., Green, supra note 9 and accompanying text (stating that a civil
proceeding under FIRREA is basically a criminal proceeding without constitutional
provisions).
166. In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), the Court said that the right to a jury
trial comes into play with serious crimes. The best way to tell if the legislature considers the
crime to be serious is to look at the punishment that is attached to a conviction under the
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right to counsel does not exist in every criminal case. In a misdemeanor
case it comes into play only when the defendant is incarcerated (even for
one day).167 In a misdemeanor case in which the judge only fines the
defendant and imposes no jail sentence, there is no right on the part of an
indigent defendant to have a lawyer provided. The severity of sanctions
explains all of these rules.
The severity of sanctions also explains the need in some cases for
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. A conviction in a criminal case requires
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.168 The opinion in In re Winship
emphasized the loss of liberty that imprisonment entails.169 And, even
though no incarceration is actually imposed on the defendant in some cases
and the fine is not large, the stigma attached to a criminal conviction and
the civil disabilities that may be imposed on the defendant call for the
highest standard of proof.170 By comparison, an administrative proceeding
in which a fine is imposed by an administrative agency for violations of its
regulations does not require such a high level of proof. In fact,
preponderance of evidence is normally an adequate standard of proof.171 A
substantial administrative fine does not change this because the violation of
administrative regulations does not carry the stigma of a criminal
conviction and cannot result in incarceration as a punishment. Congress
can require a higher standard of proof, but in the absence of such a decision
by Congress, the courts do not insist on a higher level.172
statute.
Incarceration for over 6 months indicates that the crime is a serious
one. Incarceration for not more than 6 months indicates that the crime is petty. So this is
based on potential punishment, not actual punishment. The right to a jury trial comes into
play with serious crimes only. See also Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322 (1996)
(holding that the defendant’s offense was punished by a maximum of six months in jail and
thus was a petty offense that did not warrant a jury trial).
167. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (holding that because the defendant was
fined $50 and not ever actually incarcerated, he did not have a constitutional right to a
lawyer).
168. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) at 361(describing the requirement that guilt
of a criminal charge be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
169. Id. at 363-64.
170. Id.
171. Unless Congress requires a higher standard of proof in the relevant administrative
statute, the Supreme Court does not require in administrative proceedings a standard higher
than preponderance of evidence. See Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966) (concluding that
in a deportation proceeding, the burden of proof is clear, unequivocal, and convincing
evidence); Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91 (1981) (adopting the traditional preponderanceof-the-evidence standard). For more information, see generally PIERCE, ADMIN. LAW VOL.
II, supra note 138, at 971-73 (discussing the historical progression of the Court towards a
preponderance of the evidence standard as the default standard in administrative
proceedings).
172. See supra note 171 and accompanying text (describing how the Supreme Court has
not required a higher standard of proof than preponderance of the evidence).
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Is preponderance of evidence an adequate level of protection in a
FIRREA case? The Supreme Court does not require proof beyond a
reasonable doubt in cases where an administrative fine is imposed by an
agency for violating its rules.173 This is true regardless of how large the
fine might be. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not required in a
deportation hearing that might result in someone being removed from the
United States.174 In light of the horrendous consequences of a mistake in
such a case, it is difficult to see why the highest level of proof should be
required in a FIRREA case, which would entail, at most, a financial
penalty.
The conclusion that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not called for
in a FIRREA case does not mean that procedural safeguards for a
defendant are absent in a proceeding under that statute. On the contrary,
the normal safeguards that are available in a civil case are available in a
FIRREA proceeding. Moreover, the statute provides for the right to a jury
trial. This is noteworthy because while the financial penalty that might be
imposed on the defendant places FIRREA in position adjacent to
administrative law on the continuum, the right to a jury trial provides the
defendant with a level of safeguards that exceed those found in
administrative proceedings.175
V.

CONCLUSION

FIRREA is a new weapon in the government’s arsenal to deter
financial fraud. Its use in the cases stemming from the GFC and outlined
above illustrate its power. In many ways that is good public policy. The
fraudulent actions by bad actors leading up the GFC should not go
unpunished. We want to deter future misconduct and to compensate
innocent victims.
Enforcing the anti-fraud provisions of financial
regulation promotes investor and public confidence in financial markets
and in doing so supports the smooth operation of those markets. The
questions are whether the addition of FIRREA to the other, existing laws,
both criminal and civil, is justified and whether its use is fair. As a hybrid
statute it imposes civil liability for violating criminal statutes. It neglects
the public policy goal of compensation, and instead focuses on punishment
primarily for the purposes of deterrence.
Perhaps the key (but not unique) feature of the statute is that it
173. Steadman, supra note 171.
174. Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980).
175. Jury trials and the rules of evidence that apply in judicial adjudications do not
apply in agency adjudications. PIERCE, SHAPIRO & VERKUIL, supra note 156, at § 2.8;
PIERCE, ADMIN. LAW VOL. II, supra note 138, at § 10.1 – 10.7.
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imposes civil liability for the violation of standards of conduct that are
contained in criminal statutes. Many commentators176 argue that this
arrangement— moving from criminal to civil law (or administrative law)—
is fairly unproblematic. The more controversial step is to criminalize some
type of behavior initially. This is based on a belief that criminal law should
not be used lightly. Instead, it should only be used when the behavior
brings the moral condemnation that is at the core of traditional criminal
law.177 Arguably, once we have decided that some action is a crime,
attaching civil or administrative liability to it is not a big leap.178
Criminal sanctions can be severe and the consequences of an error in
determining culpability require that significant protections be in place, both
constitutional and statutory. Criminal liability is not imposed unless a strict
burden of proof (i.e., beyond a reasonable doubt) has been met.
Traditionally there is a mens rea hurdle that must be met; there is a
presumption of innocence; typically there is a relatively short statute of
limitations; and for non-petty offenses there is a right to a jury trial.
Liability under FIRREA can be imposed without most of these protections.
Under FIRREA, there is a lower burden of proof, no mens rea requirement,
and a longer statute of limitations. In this article we have argued that this
does not make FIRREA a flawed statute. The absence of incarceration
among the sanctions that might be imposed on a defendant weighs heavily
against classifying FIRREA as a criminal statute. More importantly, we
have argued that the failure of FIRREA to fit neatly into criminal law or
civil law is not problematic.
Although FIRREA does not fit perfectly into the administrative law
model, the statute shares many characteristics of administrative law. Using
that model allows us to consider how best to achieve the public policy
goals of protecting investors and restoring confidence in capital markets.
By shifting the focus away from the civil law—criminal law dichotomy, we
turn instead to the broad public policy goals FIRREA intended to promote.
FIRREA is part of an array of statutes designed to protect financial markets
and investors. Without such protections, investors will lack confidence in
176. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 131, at 22, 25-26 (2003) (stating that criminal
punishment is harsher than civil punishment); Epstein, supra note 164 (further discussing
criminal punishment).
177. LaFave, supra note 131.
178. By contrast, going from civil to criminal liability is much more problematic. Id. at
26. Civil wrongs, either set out by statute or common law, do not necessarily carry with
them the moral condemnation that is the hallmark of a criminal act. Imposing criminal
penalties to the violation of standards of behavior that are contained in a civil statute or
common law rule is something that should not be undertaken hastily. But this is not a
concern with respect to FIRREA because it imposes civil liability for violating standards of
conduct that are already contained in criminal statutes.
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the market, which will lead to a decrease in capital. The GFC illustrates
how severe the consequences of inadequate regulation of financial markets
can be. Moreover, it is important that legal liability be imposed on the
actors whose behavior contributed to the GFC. This is important for a
variety of reasons,179 one of which is public perception and investor
confidence.
The use of administrative law to achieve these objectives is not novel.
In fact, the Securities and Exchange Commission is an administrative
agency charged with protecting financial markets. Its broad enforcement
powers allow it to meet these objectives, including the ability to bring
criminal, civil, or administrative actions.180 Both civil law and criminal law
have public policy objectives. It's important to keep in mind that these
overlap. Both try "to shape people's conduct along lines what are
beneficial to society." They accomplish this with somewhat different
sanctions, although here there is an overlap as well.181
We see FIRREA as creating a quasi-administrative scheme to promote
the important goals just mentioned. While there is no new administrative
agency created to administer the policy set forth by the statute, Congress
instead created a quasi-administrative remedy for a serious problem with
the intent that it be administered by an existing executive agency (i.e. the
DOJ). Surely it would have been within the powers of Congress to
establish a new administrative agency to carry out provisions of FIRREA.
Giving this responsibility to an existing agency in the executive branch
should not raise any red flags.
If there is a need to place FIRREA within existing legal categories, it
is best viewed as a quasi-administrative type of law. The enforcement
179. One reason to impose liability on actors whose behavior contributed to the GFC is,
of course, to deter such action by others in the future. See, e.g., Karl S. Okamoto, After the
Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA L. REV. 183, 232 (2009) (“A
seemingly logical corollary of that effort is a call for stricter legal rules with greater legal
sanctions to deter the next round of bad decisions.”). Okamoto opines that imposing greater
legal sanctions brings with it its own set of “unintended consequences.” Id. He writes that
“the prevailing response to this logic (beyond any issues of fairness and moral culpability) is
the fear of unintended consequences. What becomes of the American economy when the
cost of risk taking includes the potential for personal legal liability?” Id. We would assert
that asking the corporate actor to consider the potential for legal liability when making
decisions is the intended consequence and provides deterrence against bad behavior.
180. Investor’s Advocate, supra note 124 (“The Division of Enforcement assists the
Commission in executing its law enforcement function by recommending the
commencement of investigations of securities law violations, by recommending that the
Commission bring civil actions in federal court or as administrative proceedings before an
administrative law judge, and by prosecuting these cases on behalf of the Commission.”).
181. LaFave suggests that “[p]aying damages (especially “punitive damages”) for torts
or contract breaches is not much different from paying fines for criminal violations.”
LaFave, supra note 131.

ARTICLE 3 (ELLIS) (DO NOT DELETE)

1/7/16 2:52 PM

162

[Vol. 18:1

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

actions are proved by a preponderance of the evidence, only the
government brings the actions, and the financial penalties are paid to the
government. Certainly, the situation in the financial services industry calls
for such new measures to be put in place alongside existing measures.
Congress found the existing legal processes, both civil and criminal, to be
inadequate. This is a classic case calling for administrative-type solutions.
One of the major issues in administrative law is control over agency
actions. This statute adequately addresses any concern along these lines. It
specifies exactly what behavior can lead to liability and is very specific as
to how to calculate the fines.
At least one commentator182 has argued for a narrow interpretation that
would in effect limit the application of FIRREA to cases of fraudulent
conduct on federally insured deposits or depositors. She argues that the
effects must be “sufficiently direct, reasonably foreseeable, and not too
attenuated.”183 We think this solicitude is unjustified. If there is a concern
about imposing civil liability for what is in essence fraud, we might want to
contrast the sanctions available under FIRREA with the severity of the
criminal sanctions available under other, related statutes that deal with the
same problem. In previous financial crises, people went to jail.184 Some
commentators argued against the imposition of corporate criminal liability
for a host of reasons; perhaps the imposition of civil or quasi-administrative
liability for the violation of criminal statutes is a more palatable alternative.
The DOJ can pursue a criminal case under a predicate offense if it
thinks it can prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. If it gets a
conviction, that would entail the consequences of a criminal conviction,
e.g., the stigma and moral condemnation, along with criminal fines, etc.
Using FIRREA instead means that the special negative consequences of a
criminal conviction are absent. The sanctions can be severe, perhaps more
so than under a criminal conviction, but this is not unheard of either.185
Congress uses existing criminal laws as the standards of behavior in this
non-criminal regulatory scheme. We see FIRREA as a formidable weapon
in the arsenal to fight financial fraud, to protect investors, and to ensure
confidence in the market and, as such, support its use.

182. King, supra note 21, at 781-87.
183. Id. at 786.
184. See generally Zaring, supra note 1 (noting that even huge civil penalties might be
seen as less harsh of a punishment than jail time).
185. LaFave, supra note 131, at 12.

